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1 8.01 Overview of the Liability Sharing Rules
[1] General
Sections 752(a) and 752(b) speak in terms of increases or
decreases "in a partner's share of the liabilities of a
partnership," yet nowhere in the statute is any attempt made to
indicate the~manner in which a partner's "share" of liabilities is
to be determined. That task is left entirely to the Regulations.
The original liability sharing rules, which were promulgated as
Regulation § 1.752-1(e) in 1956 and are referred to in this
Chapter as the Old Regulations, are a mere two paragraphs in
length. While the Old Regulations were mercifully brief, they
were mercilessly ambiguous and unhelpful in resolving even simple
liability sharing questions in the context of modern complex
partnerships. The Old Regulations were replaced in late 1988 by
comprehensive new regulations. These rules, which were published
in proposed and temporary form, are referred to in this Chapter as
the New Regulations. The New Regulations are regrettably lengthy,
complex and detailed, but they provide a framework that is both
theoretically sound and sufficiently comprehensive to resolve
clearly most of the issues that were left open by the Old
Regulations.
This outline is a draft of a Chapter to be included in the
next edition of McKee, Nelson & Whitmire, Federal Taxation of
Partnerships and Partners (Warren, Gorham & Lamont).
10 Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1989.
Both the Old Regulations and the New Regulations share a
common theoretical underpinning: partnership recourse liabilities
are allocated among the partners in the manner in which they share
partnership losses, while partnership nonrecourse liabilities are
allocated in the manner that the partners share profits. In
contrast, however, to the Old Regulations, which did not identify
the nature of the controlling loss or profit sharing ratios, the
New Regulations provide detailed rules for determining the loss or
profit sharing ratios that govern liability allocation.
[2] Effective Date of New Regulations
With significant exceptions, the New Regulations apply, 2n a
liability by liability basis, to liabilities incurred on or after
January 30, 1989. Conversely, the Old Regulations continue to
apply to liabilities incurred before January 30, 1989, and under a
special grandfather rule, to liabilities incurred on or after
January 30, 1989, pursuant to a "written binding contract" in
effect before December 29, 1988 and at all times thereafter.I
Although the effective date provisions do not expressly so
state, it seems that any transaction between the partnership-
obligor and a holder of a partnership liability that would be
treated by the holder as a sale or exchange of the liability under
S 1001 should constitute the incurring of a new liability by the
obligor partnership. This concept probably means that most
refinancings will be subject to the New Regulations. In addition,
liabilities of a partnership that is terminated for tax purposes
under 9 708(b)(1)(B) should be treated as incurred by the
-2-
successor partnership upon its deemed formation, and hence should
be governed by the New Regulations.
While the New Regulations generally apply prospectively on a
liability-by-liability basis, there is one significant area of
retroactivity relating to loans that are nonrecourse liabilities
for purposes of Regulation S 1.1001-2 and are held or guaranteed
by a partner. The New Regulations apply to any such liabilities
beginning on the later of March 1, 1984, or the first day
thereafter on which a partner either holds the liability or
guarantees it. 2 Thus, if a partner guaranteed or held an
otherwise nonrecourse partnership liability prior to March 1, 1984
and at all times thereafter, the New Regulations are not
retroactively applied. Instead, the Old Regulations and
interpretive authority continue to apply. In any other case, the
New Regulations apply retroactively to March 1, 1984, or the first
day thereafter that a partner either held the liability or
guaranteed it. Although the language of the effective date rules
are opaque on the point, Treasury officials have indicated that,
under their intent and interpretation of the rules, nonrecourse
liabilities held or guaranteed, prior to December 29, 1988, by
related persons (and not directly by partners) are not covered by
the retroactive rules in the New Regulations.
3
Partnerships were permitted to come under the New Regulations
as of their first taxable year ending after December 29, 1988, by
making an election on a timely filed (with extensions) return for
their first taxable year ending after December 30, 1988. 4 If an
-3-
election was made, all liabilities were reallocated according to
the New Regulations, and any net adjustments were treated as net
S 752(a) or S 752(b) contributions or distributions.
In the absence of an election to apply the New Regulations to
all partnership liabilities beginning with partnership's first
taxable year ending after December 29, 1988, the Old Regulations
and related interpretive authority continue to apply to most
partnership liabilities incurred before January 30, 1989.
Accordingly, for an indefinite period both the Old Regulations and
the New Regulations will apply simultaneously to most partnerships
in existence on January 30, 1989. The significance of the Old
Regulations will, of course, wane over time and the manner in
which the New Regulations resolve certain issues may influence the
5
resolution of similar issues under the Old Regulations.
Nevertheless, for many partnerships, the Old Regulations will be
important for a long time.
8.02 The Old Regulations
The Old Regulations are reprinted in their entirety below:
Partner's share of partnership liabilities. A partner's
share of partnership liabilities shall be determined in
accordance with his ratio for sharing losses under the
partnership agreement. In the case of a limited partnership,
a limited partner's share of partnership liabilities shall
not exceed the difference between his actual contribution
credited to him by the partnership and the total contribution
which he is obligated to make under the limited partnership
agreement. However, where none of the partners have any
personal liability with respect to a partnership liability
(as in the case of a mortgage on real estate acquired by the
partnership without the assumption by the partnership or any
of the partners of any liability on the mortgage), then all
partners, including limited partners, shall be considered as
sharing such liability under section 752(c) in the same
proportion as they share the profits. The provisions of this
paragraph may be illustrated by the following example:
Example. G is a general partner and L is a limited
partner in partnership GL. Each makes equal contributions of
$20,000 cash to the partnership upon its formation. Under
the terms of the partnership agreement, they are to share
profits equally but L's liabilities are limited to the extent
of his contribution. Subsequently, the partnership pays
$10,000 for real property which is subject to a mortgage of
$5,000. Neither the partnership nor any of the partners
assume any liability on the mortgage. The basis of such
property to the partnership is $15,000. The basis of G and L
for their partnership interests is increased by $2,500 each,
since each partner's share of the partnership liability (the
$5,000 mortgage) has increased by that amount. However, if
the partnership had assumed the mortgage so that G had become
personally liable thereunder, G's basis for his interest
would have been increased by $5,000 and L's basis would
remain unchanged. 6
In applying these rules, it is necessary to distinguish
limited partnerships from other partnerships, and limited partners
from other partners of limited partnerships. Neither "limited
partnership" nor "limited partner" is defined in the Code or
Regulations, but the internal logic of the quoted Regulation
suggests that the key concept should be limited liability under
applicable state law. Thus, "limited partnership" includes any
partnership in which some of the partners enjoy limited liability,
a definition that encompasses partnerships formed under state
statutes corresponding to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act as
well as partnerships formed under other limited liability statutes
peculiar to certain states. Similarly, the term "limited partner"
should include any partner enjoying limited liability under
applicable state statutes. A putative limited partnership which
fails to comply substantially with the requirement that a
certificate of limited partnership be filed under the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act may be treated as a general partnership
for state-law purposes8 and should also be categorized as a
general partnership under § 1.752-1(e) of the Old Regulations. A
partner who is denominated a limited partner but who in fact
participates in the management and control of the partnership,
thereby subjecting himself to liability as a general partner,9
should be treated as a general partner for purposes of the
Regulation.
-6-
[1] Restatement of the Old Sharing Rules
The manner in which the Old Regulations allocate liabilities
among partners in a general partnership may be restated as
follows: All recourse liabilities are allocated in accordance
with the ratios in which the partners share partnership losses,
while all nonrecourse liabilities are allocated in accordance with
the ratios in which they share partnership profits.
The rules applicable to limited partnerships are more
complicated, and may be restated as follows:
Rule 1. First, all partners, general and limited, share
nonrecourse liabilities in accordance with their respective
interests in partnership profits.
Rule 2. Next, each limited partner's share of recourse
liabilities is equal to the lesser of (1) the amount, if any,
by which the total contribution that he is obligated to make
to the partnership exceeds his actual contribution, or
(2) that portion of such liabilities which corresponds to his
share of partnership losses.
Rule 3. Finally, all remaining partnership recourse
liabilities are shared among the general partners in
proportion to their respective interests in partnership
losses (e.g., if general partner A has a 15 percent interest
in losses and general partner B has a 5 percent interest in
losses, three-quarters of unallocated recourse liabilities
are allocated to A and one-quarter to B).
-7-
The assertion, in the third rule, that all unallocated
recourse liabilities are allocable to the general partners is
based on the last sentence of the Example in Old Regulation
S 1.752-1(e), which allocates 100. percent of a recourse liability
to a general partner who has an interest of only 50 percent in
partnership profits (and, presumably, losses). 1 0 The method of
sharing recourse liabilities among several general partners is
based on the first sentence of the Old Regulations. The third
rule is defensible on the ground that it increases partners' bases
in the aggregate by the full amount of partnership liabilities,
thereby preserving the fundamental equality of basis between
11
partners and partnership.
The sharing rules provided by the Old Regulations for
recourse liabilities apparently were intended to reflect the
manner in which the partners will share responsibility for payment
of the liability if it is not satisfied by the partnership. In
effect, each partner is permitted to increase the basis of his
partnership interest by the portion of the liability which he is
12
contingently liable for if the partnership fails. The sharing
rules with respect to nonrecourse liabilities necessarily are
based on different considerations, since there is no possibility
that the partners may be called upon to satisfy such liabilities.
By allocating nonrecourse liabilities to all partners in
accordance with their profit-sharing ratios, the Old Regulations
recognize that the liability will be satisfied only out of profits
or assets of the partnership and that no partner, regardless of
his status as a general or limited partner, has any personal
responsibility for the debt.
13
[21 Nonrecourse Liabilities Under the Old Regulations
Because the Old Regulations allocate recourse liabilities
according to the partners' loss interests and nonrecourse
liabilities according to their profits interests, it is important
to distinguish recourse from nonrecourse liabilities. This
distinction is crucial for limited partners who can only include
recourse liabilities in their bases to the extent of their
obligations to make additional contributions.
[a] Defining Nonrecourse Liabilities
A partnership obligation is a nonrecourse liability within
the meaning of Old Regulation § 1.752-1(e) if it is both a
"liability" for purposes of S 752 and "nonrecourse" as defined by
the Regulations. Paragraphs 7.01 and 7.02 discuss various
theories under which certain obligations may be excluded from the
S 752 definition of "liability." Under the Old Regulations, a
nonrecourse liability is a liability with respect to which "none
of the partners have any personal liability." The key words in
the Regulation are "none" and "any," both of which suggest a
14
narrow construction of the provision.
The Regulation contains only one example of a nonrecourse
liability: a mortgage liability on real estate acquired by a
partnership, subject to the mortgage but without the assumption by
the partnership or any partner of any liability on the mortgage.
Other types of nonrecourse liabilities would include notes secured
-9-
by purchase-money deeds of trusts in states (such as California)
that have enacted antideficiency legislation in connection with
certain types of transactions, and notes under which the
creditor's recourse is contractually limited to property securing
the note. State law should be determinative in ascertaining
whether a liability is nonrecourse.
The Tax Court's first encounter with the nonrecourse
liability definition occurred in an unusual factual situation and
produced a literal interpretation of the definition. In Curtis W.
15
Kingbay, the taxpayers (husband and wife) were the only original
limited partners in a partnership that incurred losses
substantially in excess of their capital contributions. The sole
general partner was a nominally capitalized corporation owned by
the husband. The partnership borrowed substantial sums from the
husband and also from unrelated institutional lenders to finance
the construction of apartment buildings. The corporate general
partner was personally liable for all of these debts.
The Commissioner determined that no portion of these debts
should be added to the limited partners' bases, and, hence,
disallowed all deductions in excess of their equity investments
16
under S 704(d). The taxpayers argued, among other things, that
the debts were in substance nonrecourse because the general
partner was a dummy with no significant assets. The Tax Court
rejected this argument, stating that because the corporate general
partner served a business purpose -- limiting the personal
liability of the taxpayers -- it was a viable entity and should
-10-
not be ignored, particularly at the behest of those who had formed
* 17
it.
Some commentators have concluded that Kingbay indicates a
tendency to exalt form over substance in literally applying the
nonrecourse liability rules, but the case really seems to be
little more than another application of the basic axiom that a
taxpayer who has made his bed must lie in it. Whether the
government will have as hard a time arguing substance over form in
18
a different case remains to be seen.
[b] Conduit Purchases
In some cases, a lender providing financing for the purchase
of a partnership asset may insist on personal liability. It has
been suggested that nonrecourse treatment may be achieved even
under these circumstances, if the general partner purchases the
property, becoming personally liable for the financing, and then
transfers it to the partnership subject to the liability, but
without the assumption of the liability by the partnership. The
result of these transactions is that no partner has any personal
liability as a partner and, if there is more than one general
partner, some general partners have no personal liability in any
capacity.
The validity of the distinction between a general partner who
is liable as a partner and a general partner who is liable in
another capacity is questionable. The Old Regulation makes no
distinction of this sort, and there seems to be no difference in
substance. The probability that the courts would refuse to honor
-11-
this distinction is increased if it is obvious, as it ordinarily
will be, that the general partner acted on behalf of the
partnership in purchasing the property.
1 9
The presence of multiple general partners does little to
improve the efficacy of this technique. Nonrecourse liabilities
are those with respect to which "none of the partners have any
personal liability.'2 0 If the partnership purchases the property
directly, subject to (but without assuming) the indebtedness and
one of the general partners agrees to be personally liable for the
debt, it is clear that'the debt is not a nonrecourse liability
within the meaning of the Old Regulation. Separation of the
transaction into two steps should not alter this result.
2 1
Outside the conduit context, a nonrecourse loan directly from
a general partner has been treated as a nonrecourse debt under the
22
Old Regulations. The step-transaction doctrine is not relevant
in this context. However, the general partner obviously bears the
economic risk of loss, albeit in its capacity as a lender rather
than as a partner. Under the New Regulations, nonrecourse loans
from partners (or related persons) cannot increase the basis of
the other partners in their partnership interests.
2 3
[c] Guaranties by Nonpartners
A similar technique for attempting to satisfy the nonrecourse
liability definition involves the parent corporation of a
corporate general partner acting as guarantor of the partnership's
nonrecourse indebtedness. Alternatively, the guarantor may be an
individual nonpartner-shareholder of the corporate general
-12-
24partner. Arguably, since the guarantor is not a partner, the
nonrecourse liability definition has been satisfied. No "partner"
has any personal liability for the debt.
Despite technical compliance with the definition, most
seasoned tax practitioners are likely to have some misgivings
about this approach. Even if the corporate general partner is a
substantial entity, formed for valid business reasons unrelated to
the matter at hand, the Service may attempt to treat the liability
as a recourse liability on the theory that a guaranty by a
shareholder of the general partner means the shareholder's assets,
including its shares of the corporate general partner, are
available to satisfy the guaranty. Through these shares in the
general partner, the argument follows, the guaranteed creditor
will ultimately be able to look to the assets of the general
partner to satisfy the debt, just as if the general partner had
guaranteed the debt directly. The shareholder's guaranty can thus
be viewed as a guaranty by both the shareholder and the general
partner, and if so viewed, it is a violation of the nonrecourse
liability rules.
2 5
While the Service may attempt to treat partnership
nonrecourse liabilities as recourse liabilities to the extent that
such liabilities are guaranteed by non-partners who are related to
partners, any such argument is weakened by the effective date
provisions of the New Regulations. Under the New Regulations an
otherwise nonrecourse partnership liability is treated as a
recourse liability to the extent that the liability is guaranteed
-13-
26by a partner or a person related to a partner. The New
Regulations apply to partnership nonrecourse liabilities that are
directly guaranteed by partners beginning as early as March 1,
1984,27 but do not apply to partnership nonrecourse liabilities
that were guaranteed by related persons before January 30, 1989.28
Since the New Regulations apply retroactively to nonrecourse
liabilities that are directly guaranteed by partners, but not to
partnership nonrecourse liabilities guaranteed by related persons,
it seems reasonable to infer that the regulation writers believed
that the related person rules in the New Regulations constituted a
change in the law and not merely a clarification of the Old
Regulations. This inference seems all the more reasonable because
the term "related person" is defined very narrowly in the New
Regulations to include only those related parties that can
reasonably be viewed as economic alter egos.
[d] Partial Recourse Debts
Another technique to enhance the lender's position, without
disturbing the nonrecourse character of most of a partnership's
indebtedness, is to provide for personal liability with respect to
only a portion of the debt (e.g., the general partners might agree
to guarantee 20 percent of an otherwise nonrecourse loan). The
difficulty with this approach lies in the definitional language of
Old Regulation § 1.752-1(e), which limits nonrecourse liabilities
to those with respect to which no partner has "any personal
liability" (emphasis added). Arguably, liability for 20 percent
of the debt taints the entire debt under this language.
2 9
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Despite the language of Old Regulations, the portion of the
debt that is not guaranteed must be satisfied solely from the
profits of the partnership and should, in theory, be allocated
according to the profit-sharing ratios of the partners. This
portion of the debt cannot be economically borne by any of the
partners, and thus it should not be allocated to the general
partners in accordance with their loss-sharing ratios simply
because one partner is personally liable on a different portion of
the debt. This result is particularly perverse if the partial
guarantor is a limited partner, in which case the potential
personal liability of a limited partner could act as a springboard
to shift the liability away from the limited partners.
3 0
While the Service seems to agree that it is appropriate to
bifurcate a partially recourse debt for this purpose, the Tax
Court has had some difficulty getting the message. In Arthur E.
31Long, , the Tax Court indicated in dicta that a partially
recourse debt is treated as recourse in its entirety under the Old
Regulations. The Service responded by announcing in a ruling that
it will not follow Long on this point, but will apply the Old
Regulations by fragmenting partially recourse liabilities into
their recourse and nonrecourse components. 3 2 Nevertheless, in
33
George F. Smith, Jr., which was decided after the Service issued
its ruling, the Tax Court, without citing the ruling, again
treated a partial recourse liability as fully recourse for § 752
purposes.
-15-
The New Regulations expressly recognize that a single
liability may be partly recourse and partly nonrecourse and treat
34the two parts as separate liabilities for S 752 purposes.
1 8.03 Sharine Recourse Liabilities Under the New Regulations
[11 Background: The Raphan Case and Section 79
of the 1984 Act
35
In Raphan v. United States, the Claims Court considered
whether a limited partnership liability was recourse or
nonrecourse for purposes of applying the Old Regulation
§ 1.752-1(e) sharing rules. The debt in question was secured by
partnership assets and the terms of the debt imposed no liability
on the partnership or its partners beyond the value of the
collateral; however, the limited partnership's general partner
personally guaranteed the debt. The Claims Court held that the
guarantee did not cause the general partner to be personally
liable for the debt within the meaning of the Regulation.
Accordingly, the court held that the debt was a nonrecourse
liability which could be included in the limited partners' bases.
Prodded by the Treasury, which feared a massive raid on the
fisc following Raphan, Congress concluded that the Claims Court's
holding was "inappropriate"3 6 and directed, in S 79(a) of the Tax
Reform Act of 1984, that S 752 (and the Regulations thereunder)
should be applied without regard to the result reached in
Raphan.3 7  In addition, § 79(b) of the 1984 Act directs the
Treasury to amend the § 752 Regulations to address the basis
-16-
effects of "guarantees, assumptions, indemnity agreements, and
similar arrangements."
The Conference Report accompanying the 1984 Act contains
additional guidance for the Treasury. The rejection of the
"holding of the Raphan decision" is to be effective March 1, 1984,
38
but other changes in the New Regulations are to be prospective.
The New Regulations are to be based "largely on the manner in
which the partners, and persons related to the partners, share the
economic risk of loss with respect to partnership debt (other than
bona fide nonrecourse debt, as defined by [the New
Regulations])." 39
121 The Economic risk of Loss Concept
Under the New Regulations, a partnership liability is a
recourse liability only to the extent that one or more partners
(or related persons) bear the "economic risk of loss" with respect
40
to the liability. A partner's share of partnership recourse
liabilities "equals that portion of the recourse liabilities of
the partnership for which such partner [or persons related to such
partner] bears the economic risk of loss. . . . .41 Thus, under
the New Regulations the economic risk of loss concept is critical
both in determining whether liabilities are recourse and in
allocating recourse liabilities among the partners.
The concept of economic risk of loss is explicated in detail
below, but it is important to understand at the outset that a
liability which is treated as a nonrecourse liability for other
tax and business purposes may constitute a recourse liability
-17-
under the New Regulations. For example, a partner is treated as
bearing the economic risk of loss for a liability (and therefore
the liability is treated as recourse for § 752 purposes) to the
extent that the partner (or a related person) holds or guarantees
the liability,4 2 even if the liability would be treated as
nonrecourse for purposes of Regulation S 1.1001-2 or for other
purposes.
Despite the length and detail of the regulatory definition of
.43
the term "economic risk of loss," the underlying concept is
relatively simple and can be summarized as follows: At any time,
a partner bears the economic risk of loss for a partnership
liability to the extent that the partner (or a related person)
would be legally obligated to make net payments, directly or
indirectly, to satisfy the liability out of his or her
non-partnership assets if, at such time, the partnership had no
assets and all its liabilities were due. The New Regulations
summarize the test for economic risk of loss as follows:
"Generally, a partner bears the economic risk of loss for a
partnership liability to the extent that the partner (or
person related to the partner) would be obligated to make a
payment to the creditor or a contribution to the partnership
with respect to a partnership liability (and would not be
entitled to be reimbursed for such contribution or payment by
another partner, a person related to another partner, or the
partnership) if all of the partnership's liabilities were due
and payable in full, all of the partnership's assets
-18-
(including money) were worthless, the partnership disposed of
all of its assets in a fully taxable transaction for no
consideration (other than relief from certain [generally
nonrecourse] liabilities), and the partnership allocated its
items of income, gain, loss, deduction, and credit for the
year among the partners and liquidated the partners'
interests in the partnership.'
4 4
Five aspects of the test for economic risk of loss merit
emphasis: First, the test takes into account all statutory and
contractual obligations relating to partnership liabilities and
,capital among the partners, between the partners and the
partnership, between the partnership and its creditors, and
between the partners and the partnership's creditors.4 5  Thus,
guarantees, indemnifications and other obligations running to
creditors, other partners or the partnership are relevant, even if
they are not included in the partnership agreement. Second, any
obligation of a partner to make a payment or a contribution is
offset by any right of such partner to be reimbursed or
indemnified by any other partner (or a person related to any other
46
partner) for any such payment or contribution. Thus, for
example, even though a limited partner's separate guarantee of a
recourse partnership liability is taken into account in
determining whether he or she bears the economic risk of loss for
such liability, any economic risk of loss that would otherwise
result from such guarantee is reduced to the extent that, upon
performance of the guarantee, the guarantor/limited partner would
-19-
be subrogated to the creditor's claim against the partnership and
the general partners. Third, for purposes of determining economic
risk of loss, obligations and rights of persons that are related
to a partner are treated as obligations and rights of the
partner.4 7 Fourth, in measuring economic risk of loss, the New
Regulations assume that any partner, related person or the
partnership will actually discharge its contractual obligation to
make payments unless the facts and circumstances indicate a plan
48
to circumvent or avoid the obligation. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, at any given time, a partner's economic risk of
loss for partnership liabilities is determined by assuming,
regardless of the partnership's actual financial situation, that
its assets are worthless and that it is liquidated.
4 9
Even to those accustomed to the ironic twists of federal tax
law, it may seem strange that the New Regulations require a
prosperous, ongoing partnership to allocate its recourse
liabilities among its partners on the assumption that the its
assets become instantly worthless and that it liquidates. Indeed,
most partnerships pay their liabilities out of profits and even
those that fall on hard times generally satisfy their obligations
by liquidating existing partnership assets, without the necessity
of calling on their partners. Even in the direst case, a
partnership can be expected to have some asset value remaining to
mitigate the amount that its partners must contribute or pay to
satisfy its liabilities. Why then, are the New Regulations based
on an assumption that is almost never true?
-20-
The answer lies in the relationship between the basis rules
in § 752, the allocation rules in § 704(b), and the limitation in
S 704(d), which prevents a partner from deducting losses in excess
of the basis of his or her partnership interest. The New
Regulations explicitly recognize the need to coordinate the
operation of the liability sharing rules in S 752 with the
S 704(b) allocation rules: "The coordination of these two
sections reflects the fact that one of the principal purposes for
including partnership liabilities in the bases of the partners'
interests in the partnership is to support the deductions that
will be claimed by the partners for the items attributable to
those liabilities.'"5 0  In the "normal" situation in which the
bases of the partners for their partnership interests are equal to
the partnership's aggregate basis for its assets, the most direct
way to accomplish this coordination is to allocate partnership
liabilities among the partners for basis purposes so as to reflect
the way in which partnership losses would be allocated among the
partners if the "maximum" loss were sustained with respect to
existing partnership liabilities (in other words, if all
partnership assets became worthless and the partners were required
to satisfy all recourse liabilities out of non-partnership
assets). Thus, in allocating liabilities under S 752, it is
appropriate to anticipate how partnership losses (in excess of
partnership capital) would be allocated if the partnership
incurred the maximum loss it could incur. Accordingly, in
determining economic risk of loss for partnership liabilities the
-21-
New Regulations assume the worst -- that all partnership assets
become worthless -- and seek to "preallocate" partnership recourse
liabilities in a manner that will track the manner in which
partnership losses would be allocated if the worst happened. If
something less catastrophic than the worst occurs, no harm is done
by this approach.
[3] Constructive Liquidation: The Condition Precedent to
Determining Economic Risk of Loss
A partner bears the economic risk of loss for a partnership
liability only to the extent he would bear the loss out of his
non-partnership assets if the partnership were wholly unable to
pay the liability. Therefore, as a condition precedent to
determining who bears the economic risk of loss for partnership
liabilities under the New Regulations, it is necessary to
hypothesize a situation in which, simultaneously, the
partnership's assets become wholly worthless, the partners'
capital accounts are adjusted to reflect a loss of the entire book'
value of the partnership's assets, all contractual and statutory
obligations of the partners relating to the partnership and its
liabilities are triggered and performed, and the partnership
liquidates. The New Regulations understatedly refer to this
hypothetical cataclysm as a "constructive liquidation."
The following events are deemed to occur in connection with a
constructive liquidation:
(1) Assets Become Worthless. With limited exceptions, all
partnership assets (including money, insurance claims and other
rights against unrelated persons) become wholly worthless.5 1 The
-22-
only assets that are not treated as becoming worthless under this
rule are (a) certain assets which, although nominally owned by the
partnership for the sole purpose of securing payment of a
partnership liability, are consistently treated by the New
Regulations as if they were actually owned by the partner who
52
contributed them, and (b) obligations of partners and related
persons to make contributions to the partnership or payments to
creditors or other persons with respect to partnership
liabilities.
(2) Liabilities Become Due. All of the partnership's
liabilities become fully due and payable "because of the
partnership's failure to make the payments required with respect
to sch iabiitis ... .54
to such liabilities . . .. " 5 Such liabilities include any
"wrapped indebtedness" owed by a partner or related person to a
third party that is treated as a separate liability of the
partnership.
(3) Assets Are Disposed Of. With certain exceptions., the
partnership disposes of all of its assets in a fully taxable
56
transaction for no consideration. There are two exceptions to
this general rule: First, assets that are contributed to and used
by the partnership for the sole purpose of securing partnership
liabilities are treated as disposed of for their fair market value
in complete or partial satisfaction of the liabilities they
secure. 5 7 Second, after taking into account such dispositions,
partnership assets that are security for nonrecourse liabilities
(those with respect to which the creditor's repayment rights are
-23-
limited to one or more partnership assets) are treated as disposed
of in satisfaction of such liabilities.
58
(4) All Items Are Allocated. The partnership's tax year
closes on the date of the constructive liquidation and all items
of partnership income, gain, loss, deduction and credit (actual
items as well as those generated by the hypothetical liquidation)
are allocated to the partners in accordance with the partnership
agreement.
5 9
(5) Liquidation. The partners' interests in the partnership
are liquidated.
6 0
The net effect of steps (1) through (4) is to create a
hypothetical balance sheet. The asset side of this balance sheet
will always be zero. The only liabilities remaining on the other
side of the balance sheet will be those with respect to which
partners or related persons bear the economic risk of loss. The
partners' capital accounts will be fully adjusted to reflect the
disposition of all of the partnership's assets and will, in the
aggregate, have a net deficit balance exactly equal to the
remaining liabilities. The next step is to utilize this balance
sheet and the definitions of "net contribution obligations" and
"net payment obligations" to determine the extent to which each
partner would bear the economic risk of loss with respect to each
partnership liability, as discussed below in 1 8.03[4]. Before
turning to this step, however, it may be helpful to consider a
simple example of the mechanics of a constructive liquidation:
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Example. A and B form the AB general partnership to
invest in real estate. Each contributes $100,000 cash. In
addition, B contributes marketable securities which have a
fair market value and a basis of $100,000 at all relevant
times. All profits and losses are to be allocated equally to
the partners, except that any gain or loss with respect to
the securities is to be allocated 100% to B. The partnership
agreement provides that capital accounts will be maintained
in accordance with the § 704(b) Regulations, liquidating
distributions will be based on capital accounts, and any
partner with a deficit capital account balance on liquidation
must make it up. The partnership buys building X for
$300,000, consisting of a $100,000 cash down payment and a
$200,000 full recourse note to the seller, and building Y for
$400,000, consisting of a $50,000 cash down payment and a
$350,000 nonrecourse loan to the seller that is secured by a
mortgage on building Y and a pledge of the marketable
securities contributed by B. The remaining $50,000 of cash
is retained for future needs. Following these transactions,
the balance sheet of AB is as follows:
Assets Liabilities and Capital
Cash $ 50,000 Recourse Loan $200,000















Upon a constructive liquidation of the partnership
immediately after these transactions, the cash and both
buildings are treated as worthless; the securities are
treated as if they were owned by B under the special "solely
for security" rule.6 1 Both loans are treated as due and
payable. The partnership is treated as receiving
consideration in the form of relief from liability upon the
hypothetical disposition of its assets to the extent that the
nonrecourse loan is a liability for which the creditor's
repayment rights are limited to one or more partnership
assets. Under the "solely for security" rule, the pledge of
the securities is treated as an obligation of B to make a
payment to the nonrecourse creditor, limited to the value of
the securities. Thus, only $250,000 of the $350,000
nonrecourse loan is a liability with respect to which the
creditor's rights are limited to partnership assets, and the
partnership is deemed to receive consideration of $250,000 in
relief from such liability in exchange for building Y, which
has a basis of $400,000, thus generating a $150,000 loss.
The cash and building X are treated as being worthless and
disposed of in a taxable transaction, generating an
additional $350,000 loss. Total losses of $500,000 are
allocated equally between A and B, producing the following
balance sheet:
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Assets Liabilities and Capital







As discussed below, this balance sheet demonstrates that A
and B have contribution obligations of $150,000 and $50,000,
respectively,.with respect to the $200,000 recourse loan, and
consequently $150,000 of such loan increases A's basis and
$50,000 increases B's basis. The $100,000 of the
"nonrecourse" loan that is secured by the securities is
allocated entirely to B, and the remaining $250,000 is
treated as a nonrecourse liability that is allocated in
accordance with the rules discussed in 1 8.04 below.
[41 Net Contribution and Net Payment Obligations
All statutory and contractual obligations of the partners
(and related persons) to the partnership, to other partners (or
related persons), and to partnership creditors are taken into
account in determining the extent to which the partners bear the
economic risk of loss for partnership liabilities. The New
Regulations divide these obligations into two categories: (1) net
62
contribution obligations, and (2) net payment obligations.
[a] Net Contribution Obligations
[i] General
A partner has the economic risk of loss for a partnership
liability to the extent the partner would be required to make a
net contribution to the partnership with respect to such liability
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if the partnership were constructively liquidated.6 3 Generally,
there are three steps in determining a partner's net contribution
obligation: (1) determine the gross contributions that the partner
would be required to make in the event of a constructive
liquidation; (2) determine the net contributions that the partner
would be required to make by reducing his gross contributions by
any right that he has to be reimbursed for such contributions; and
(3) determine what portion of any resulting net contributions
would be applied, directly or indirectly, to pay a particular
partnership liability and is therefore a net contribution
obligation "with respect to" that partnership liability.
A partner's gross contribution obligation is equal to the sum
of (1) the outstanding principal balance of any promissory note
made by such partner and contributed by him to the partnership;
6 4
(2) any other obligation of such partner to make contributions to
the partnership, whether arising by operation of law (for example,
under the Uniform Partnership Act or Uniform Limited Partnership
Act) or under the partnership agreement (for example, an
obligation to make a fixed contribution or to restore a deficit
65
capital account at the time of liquidation); and (3) the amount
of such partner's obligation to "reimburse" other partners for
their contributions to the partnership.
6 6
The net contribution a partner would be required to make to
the partnership at the time of a constructive liquidation is the
gross contributions such partner would be required to make
"reduced by the aggregate amount of the reimbursements . . that
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such partner or a person related to such partner would be entitled
to receive with respect to such contributions." 6 7 Reimbursements
are discussed in I 8.03[4][c] below.
[iii Allocating Net Contribution Obligations to
Specific Partnership Liabilities
Once a partner's net contribution obligation is determined by
ascertaining the contributions he would be required to make at the
time of a constructive liquidation and reducing those
contributions by any reimbursements to which he would be entitled,
the final step is to determine the extent to which the net
contribution obligation is "with respect to" a partnership
liability. A net contribution obligation whose proceeds would not
be applied, directly or indirectly, to pay partnership liabilities
does not result in economic risk of loss with respect to such
liabilities and, hence, does not cause liabilities to be allocated
to the obligated partner under § 752.
The New Regulations define an obligation to make a net
contribution with respect to a partnership liability as --
"the amount determined by multiplying the net contribution
that such partner would be obligated to make to the
partnership at the time of [a constructive] liquidation ...
by the fraction obtained by dividing--
(1) The outstanding partnership indebtedness
(within the meaning of paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(B)(4) of
this section) with respect to that liability at the time
of such liquidation; by
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(ii) The sum of the net contributions that all
partners would be obligated to make to the partnership
at the time of such liquidation." 
6 8
This formula effectively allocates individual partnership
liabilities among the partners according to their relative net
contribution obligations.
Example. After a constructive liquidation, a two-person
partnership has liabilities of $50 and $150 and each of its
partners has a deficit capital account of $100 that he is
obligated to restore. Each partner is allocated $75 of the
$150 liability ($100 net contribution obligation, multiplied
by the "outstanding partnership indebtedness . . . with
respect to [such] liability" of $150, divided by the
partners' aggregate net contribution obligations of $200). 69
The partners' aggregate net contribution obligations are
likely to exceed the partnership's recourse liabilities if, after
a constructive liquidation, any partner has a positive capital
account. In this situation, the regulatory formula prevents any
partner from claiming economic risk of loss for a partnership
liability to the extent his net contribution would be applied to
repay a portion of another partner's positive capital account.
Example: Assume that, after a constructive liquidation
of a three-person partnership, the partnership has a single
recourse liability of $100, one partner has a positive
capital account of $100, and the other two partners are
liable to restore their negative capital accounts of $100
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each. The partners have no other payment obligations with
respect to the liability. The proceeds of the deficit
capital account contributions of the two partners with
negative capital accounts would be applied to pay both the
liability and the third partner's positive capital account.
Under these circumstances, even though each of the deficit
capital account partners has a $100 net contribution
obligation, each has a net contribution obligation with
respect to the partnership liability of only $50 ($100 net
contribution obligation, multiplied by partnership
indebtedness with respect to the liability of $100, divided
by the $200 aggregate net contribution obligation of both
deficit capital account partners). Accordingly, each has an
economic risk of loss of $50 with respect to the liability.
The third partner, who has a positive capital account and no
net contribution obligation, has no economic risk with
respect to the liability, even though he may have a share of
partnership losses which, under the Old Regulations, would
result in a portion of the liability being inclUded in the
basis of his interest.
The formula quoted above includes the curiously redundant
sounding phrase "outstanding partnership indebtedness . . . with
respect to [a partnership] liability." While the notion that a
partnership may not have an indebtedness with respect to a portion
of a partnership liability may seem novel, one reason for this
phrase is to assure that a net contribution obligation does not
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result in a partner being treated as having an economic risk of
loss for a nonrecourse partnership liability. Thus, the New
Regulations provide that a partnership is not treated as having an
"indebtedness" with respect to a partnership liability to the
extent the liability "constitutes a liability for which the
creditor's right to repayment is limited to one or more assets of
the partnership .... .,70 In addition, the partnership is not
treated as having an indebtedness with respect a liability to the
extent a partner is treated as having a nonreimbursable obligation
to pay such liability because he or she has contributed assets
that are used solely to secure it. 7 1 This exclusion is necessary
because the economic risk of loss for such liability is already
allocated to the property-contributing partner to the extent of
the value of the contributed property and, therefore, should not
be allocated a second time as a result of such partner's or
another partner's net contribution obligation.
[b] Net Payment Obligations
In general, a partner may have the economic risk of loss for
a partnership liability either because he is obligated to make a
net contribution with respect to such liability or because he is
obligated to make a net payment with respect to such liability.
7 2
Net contribution obligations are discussed in I 8.03(4][a]. This
I 8.03[4][b] discusses net payment obligations.
Generally, a partner has a net payment obligation with
respect to a partnership liability to the extent that, upon a
constructive liquidation of the partnership, the partner (or a
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related person) would be obligated to either pay the liability or
reimburse another partner (or a related person) for paying the
liability and would not himself be entitled to reimbursement for
his payment. 7 3 The concept of reimbursement is discussed in
8.03[4][c] below. Since a payment obligation does not include a
contribution obligation,7 4 payment obligations generally include
only those obligations (such as guarantees, indemnification
agreements and the like) running directly to creditors and
obligations to reimburse others for obligations running directly
to creditors. For example, if a general partner would be
obligated under the partnership agreement or applicable state law
to contribute funds to satisfy unpaid partnership creditors upon a
constructive liquidation, a limited partner's contractual
obligation to directly reimburse the general partner for a portion
of such contribution would be a contribution obligation, rather
than a payment obligation. On the other hand, a limited partner's
separate guarantee of a partnership liability would constitute a
payment obligation.
[i] Payment Obligation Resulting From Contribution of
Property Solely to Secure Partnership Liability
The New Regulations provide a special rule under which a
partner is treated as having a payment obligation with respect to
a liability to the extent of the value of any property that the
partner contributes to the partnership solely for the purpose of
75
securing such liability. Specifically, if (1) a partner makes a
contribution of property (including money, but not including a
promissory note made by the partner that is not readily
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tradeable), and (2) the property is used solely to secure the
payment of a partnership liability, then the partnership's
obligation to use the property to discharge the liability is
treated as a payment obligation of the contributing partner. The
New Regulations include a presumption that contributed property is
used solely to secure a liability if "substantially all of the
items of income, gain, loss, and deduction attributable to
such . . . property are allocated to the contributing partner and
the portion of such items allocated to the contributing partner is
greater than such partner's share of any other significant item of
partnership income, gain, loss, or deduction."
7 6
This special "solely for security" rule is essentially an
anti-gaming provision designed to prevent partners from converting
recourse liabilities into nonrecourse liabilities. Under the
normal operation of the New Regulations, a partnership liability
is a nonrecourse liability if the creditor's sole recourse is
against partnership property, so that no partner's separate assets
can be reached to satisfy the claim. On the other hand, a
partnership liability is a recourse liability to the extent the
separate assets of a partner are pledged to secure payment, even
though the pledgor/partner is not otherwise personally liable for
the debt.77  In the absence of the special solely for security
rule, the partners could convert what would otherwise be a
recourse partnership liability into a nonrecourse liability, while
effectively allowing the contributing partner to retain the
economic benefits of owning the contributed property, if instead
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of directly pledging non-partnership property to the creditor,
(1) the partner contributed the property to the partnership,
(2) the partnership used the property solely to secure the debt,
and (3) substantially all of the income and loss from the property
was specially allocated to the contributing partner.
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[c] Reimbursement
If a partner (or related person) would be obligated to make a
contribution or payment upon a constructive liquidation of the
partnership, but would be entitled to be reimbursed for all or a
portion of such contribution or payment, then, in determining such
partner's net contribution or net payment obligation, the
contribution or payment obligation is reduced by the amount of the
79
reimbursement right. Moreover, a person who is obligated to
reimburse a partner for making a contribution is himself treated
as having a contribution obligation, and a person who is obligated
to reimburse a partner for making a payment is treated as having a
payment obligation. 80
A partner (or related person) is treated as having a right to
be reimbursed for a payment or contribution to the extent that--
"(1) Another partner, a person related to a another
partner, or the partnership would be obligated to make a
payment to such partner or related person in the event that
such partner or related person makes a payment or
contribution pursuant to such obligation; and
(2) The reimbursing payment that such other person would
be obligated to make is recognized under this paragraph
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(d)(3)(ii) as an obligation to make a payment to a creditor
or other person with respect to a partnership liability or a
contribution to the partnership (or in the case of an
obligation of the partnership to reimburse a partner for a
contribution to the partnership, such obligation would be
recognized as an obligation to make a contribution to the
partnership if the partnership were a partner)." 81
[5] Obligations Taken Into Account in Determining Net
Contribution and Net Payment Obligations
[a) General
In general, a partner, a related person, or a partnership has
an obligation to make a payment or contribution for purposes of
the net payment and net contribution rules to the extent that any
other person has "a legally enforceable right to require such
partner, related person, or partnership to make such payment or
contribution. .. ,,82 Such legally enforceable obligations may
be imposed by the partnership agreement, applicable state law, or
by collateral agreements, such as guarantees or indemnities;
however, an obligation is not taken into account if its existence
or amount cannot be determined-with reasonable certainty or it is
subject to contingencies that "make it unlikely that the
obligation would ever be discharged."83 The determination of
whether an obligation exists is made by taking into account all
facts and circumstances. 84
While there is some uncertainty as to what type of
contingencies should be taken into account in determining whether
an obligation is likely to be discharged, the treatment of certain
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contingencies is relatively clear. Generally, the fact that an
obligor is not likely to have sufficient assets to perform the
obligation generally is not a contingency that prevents the
obligation from being taken into account. 85 Conversely, because
the entire scheme of allocating recourse liabilities under the
economic risk of loss approach is premised on the assumption that
the partnership will not have any assets to pay its liabilities,
the fact that such situation is extremely unlikely to occur should
not be a relevant contingency. For similar reasons, a requirement
that a creditor exhaust its remedies against the partnership
before exercising rights under a guarantee should not prevent the
guarantor's obligation from being taken into account for S 752
86purposes.
Questions concerning the impact of contingencies may arise if
the obligor's obligation is subject to contingencies related to
the partnership's performance. For example, if a partner is
obligated to make a payment with respect to a partnership
liability or a contribution to the partnership only after
construction of the partnership's property is complete or the
partnership has achieved a certain level of economic performance,
the contingency probably should prevent the payment or
contribution obligation from being taken into account until the
contingency is satisfied. This treatment appears to be warranted
because, in the event of a constructive liquidation before the
contingency is satisfied, the contingency will never be satisfied
and the obligation will never come into being. Conversely, if a
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partner's currently existing contribution or payment obligation
may cease at some point in the future, it probably should be taken
into account until the occurrence of the event that causes it to
end, regardless of whether that event is likely or unlikely to
occur. Any contingency that smacks of unreality is suspect,
however. For example, if an obligation is only enforceable under
the laws of a foreign country that has no jurisdiction over the
person or property of the obligor, the probability that the
obligee will not be able to enforce its right against the obligor
may be significant enough to warrant disregarding the obligation.
In addition to the notion that obligations are to be disregarded
if they are too uncertain or contingent, the New Regulations
contain an explicit anti-abuse rule, under which contribution and
payment obligations are not recognized if the facts and
circumstances indicate a plan to circumvent or avoid the
obligation. 87
If a contribution or payment obligation is not recognized
under these rules the partners' net payment and contribution
obligations are determined by ignoring the obligation that is not
recognized.88
[b] Arrangements Tantamount to a Guarantee
In determining whether a partner has an obligation to make a
payment or contribution, the New Regulations provide that a
contractual obligation that is not a direct payment obligation may
nevertheless be treated as a payment obligation if it is
"tantamount to a guarantee." 8 9 Under this anti-abuse rule,
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certain contractual undertakings that are not literal and direct
payment or contribution obligations may nevertheless be treated,
in effect, as payment or contribution obligations. To come within
this rule, an undertaking must be entered into to obtain a loan
and must eliminate substantially all the risk to the creditor that
the partnership will not satisfy its obligations under the loan,
assuming the partners satisfy their contractual undertaking. In
addition, one of the principal purposes of the arrangement must be
to permit partners (other than those who are directly or
indirectly liable for the undertaking) to include a portion of the
loan in the bases of their partnership interests.
Under the first prong of this rule, the undertaking must
eliminate substantially all of the risk that a partnership
liability will not be satisfied under the facts of a constructive
liquidation. Example L171 of New Regulation S 1.752-lT(k)
concludes that a partner's guarantee that the partnership will
complete a building does not cause the guarantor-partner to bear
the economic risk of loss with respect to an otherwise nonrecourse
liability secured by the building. While the creditor clearly
benefits from the completion guarantee, the guarantee does not
eliminate the risk that the partnership will default on the
liability or that the completed building will have insufficient
value to satisfy the liability. On the other hand, a guarantee
that collateral will have a specified value would effectively




Example {20) of New Regulation 1.752-lT(k) illustrates a
situation in which an undertaking eliminates substantially all of
a creditor's risk. In this example, a partnership acquires a
computer that is subject to an existing two-year lease. The
partnership obtains a loan to acquire the computer. In order to
induce the creditor to make the loan, one partner agrees to master
lease it from the partnership under a "hell or high water" lease
which requires the master lessor to maintain the computer and to
continue making lease payments even if the computer is damaged or
destroyed. The rental payments under the master lease are
sufficient to fully amortize all amounts due under the loan and
the lease agreement is pledged to the lender. Otherwise, the loan
is nonrecourse. The example concludes that the master lease
eliminates the creditor's risk of nonpayment.
Under the facts of this example, the other partner invested
in the partnership, in part, to obtain tax benefits. Although the
other partner needed to include a portion of the liability for the
loan in. its basis in order to take full advantage of such losses,
it apparently was unwilling to obligate itself to make a
contribution or payment to satisfy the loan in the event the
partnership failed, and the lender was unwilling to make a loan
secured solely by the computer. Thus, the example concludes that
one of the principal purposes of the master lease is to permit the
other partner to include a portion of the liability in his basis.
Accordingly, the master lease is treated as tantamount to a
guarantee and the partner who master leased the computer is
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treated as having the economic risk of loss for the entire
liability.
The "arrangements tantamount to a guarantee" rule of the New
Regulations is narrowly drawn So as to only apply to prevent gross
manipulation of the concept of economic risk of loss. It is not
intended to apply to common, commercial undertakings that do not
fully secure a creditor or to arrangements that lack a significant
tax avoidance motivation.
[c] Obligations Limited to the Value of Property
In order to be taken into account as a payment or
contribution obligation for purposes of determining who bears the
economic risk of loss for a partnership liability, it is not
necessary that an obligation be a general liability obligation of
a partner or related person. To the contrary, an obligation that
is secured only by non-partnership property of the obligor (or is
otherwise limited to the value of such property) is taken into
account as a payment or contribution obligation.9 1 Thus, while a
partnership liability that is secured only by partnership property
is a nonrecourse liability as to which no partner bears any
economic risk of loss, a partnership liability that is secured by
a partner's non-partnership property may be a recourse liability
as to which such partner bears some or all of the economic risk of
loss.
The amount of a contribution or payment obligation that is
limited to the value of a partner's (or related person's)
non-partnership property is based on the fair market value of the
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property.92 If the fair market value of the property is "readily
ascertainable (e.g., marketable securities)," or if the property
is "of a type that by its terms increases or decreases in value
(e.g., a debt instrument on which principal payments are made
during its term)," the value of such property is determined at
the same time as the amount of the payment or contribution
obligation that is secured by such property (or limited by its
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value) is determined. Thus, a partner's economic risk of loss
for a partnership liability will fluctuate with the value of such
property to the extent the contribution or payment obligation that
creates such economic risk of loss is secured only by (or is
limited to) the value of such property.
If the property (for example, real estate) is not readily
marketable and its value is not self-adjusting, its value is
determined as of "the latest of the time that the liability is
incurred, the time that the liability is assumed, or the time of
the most recent valuation of such property that is made in
connection with such liability." 94 Thus, if a partner pledges
property to secure an existing partnership liability, the property
apparently must be valued at the time of the pledge, even if no
actual valuation is made at that time.
[d] Obligations to Pay Interest
The drafters of the New Regulations were concerned that
partnerships might attempt to manipulate the economic risk of loss
rules by incurring long term liabilities that are nonrecourse as
to principal, but recourse as to interest. If the partnership's
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obligation to pay principal is deferred to the end of the term of
the liability, while the guaranteed interest payments are required
to be paid currently, the present value of the nonrecourse
obligation to pay deferred principal may be nominal in comparison
to the present value of the guaranteed interest. However, without
a special anti-abuse rule, the entire principal would be treated
as nonrecourse. New Regulation § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(v) is designed to
95
prevent this perceived potential for abuse. It provides:
"[I]f one or more partners (or persons related to such
partners) would be obligated (whether pursuant to the
partnership agreement, by operation of law, or otherwise) to
pay more than 20 percent of the total interest that will
accrue on any nonrecourse liability of the partnership during
the term of such liability (or if the liability has an
indefinite term, the expected term of such liability) if the
partnership fails to pay such interest, then each such
partner's economic risk of loss for such liability shall be
increased by an amount equal to the sum of the present values
of the remaining interest payments that such partner (or any
person related to such partner) would be obligated to make if
the partnership fails to make those payments (taking into
account any payment that such partner or related person may
be required to make pursuant to that obligation only to the
extent that such partner or related person would not be
entitled to be reimbursed (within the meaning of paragraph
(d)(3)(ii)(C) of this section) for such payment.)"
96
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For this purpose, the present values of future interest payments
are determined based on the applicable Federal rate.
9 7
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Example (21) of the New Regulations makes it clear that
application of the assumed interest rule does not create an
additional partnership liability equal to the present value of the
guaranteed interest payments. Instead, a portion of the
nonrecourse principal equal to present value of the interest
payments is recharacterized as a recourse liability and allocated
to the partners who are obligated to pay the interest. The
balance of the nonrecourse principal is treated as a separate
nonrecourse liability and is allocated among the partners under
the nonrecourse sharing rules.
The purview of the recourse interest rule is subject to a
limitation that is both significant and uncertain in scope.
Specifically, the New Regulations provides as follows:
"An obligation of a partner to pay any portion of the
interest that will accrue on a nonrecourse liability of the
partnership shall not be treated as an obligation to pay such
interest for purposes of this paragraph (d)(3)(v) unless it
is reasonable to expect, based on all the facts and
circumstances, that the partner would be required to pay
substantially all of the interest subject to that obligation
if the partnership failed to pay such interest. For example,
if a partner guarantees the payment of the interest due on an
otherwise nonrecourse liability but the lender can only
enforce that guarantee by first foreclosing on the property
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subject to such liability, it generally will not be
reasonable to expect that the partner would be required to
pay substantially all of the interest subject to that
guarantee unless substantially all of the interest due on
such liability is payable at the end of the term of the
liability (e.g., a liability on which no payments of
principal or interest are due until maturity).
"9 9
The preceding limitation should be read carefully. It does
not say that the recourse interest rule generally applies only if
the interest on a nonrecourse liability is payable at or near the
end of the term of the liability. Instead, it prevents the
recourse interest rule from applying if the partner or person who
is personally liable to pay the interest is not really liable for
paying future interest because the apparent obligation to pay
future interest effectively can be avoided by (1) defaulting on a
single interest payment, (2) forcing the lender to foreclose on
the security in full satisfaction of the principal amount of the
debt, and (3) thereby preventing future interest from accruing on
a debt that has been satisfied. Thus, if the lender can enforce
the interest guarantee without foreclosing on the property and
thereby extinguishing the underlying debt, the recourse interest
rule may apply even though interest, principal or both are
required to be paid or amortized over the life of the loan.
1 00
The percentage of unpaid interest for which partners have
personal liability may, in some situations, change over time as
interest payments are made. It is unclear whether the 20 percent
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rule is applied only at the time the partnership incurs the
nonrecourse liability, or whether it applies on an ongoing basis.
101The language of New Regulation is not instructive. Probably
what was intended is that the rule applies at the first time the
recourse interest payments exceed 20 percent of total anticipated
interest, regardless of when the liability is incurred, and that
thereafter. the rule continues to apply until all guaranteed
interest is paid; however, it is uncertain whether the New
Regulation will be so interpreted.
[e) Presumption that Obligations Will Be Satisfied
The New Regulations require that the rules relating to the
determination of the partners' economic risk of loss be applied by
assuming that each partner, related person and the partnership
that has a payment or contribution obligation "actually discharges
such obligation at the time of the constructive liquidation."
1 0 2
Moreover, the New Regulation makes clear that this assumption
generally applies "even if such partner's net worth is less than
the amount of the obligation."1 0 3
While the inclusion of this full performance assumption in
the New Regulations may be surprising, its absence would create
substantial practical problems. Imagine the nightmare of having
to establish each partner's net worth each time it is necessary to
determine the basis of any partner's interest in the partnership.
Moreover, a general rule that ignores the net worth of the
partners in determining economic risk of loss for S 752 purposes
is consistent with the § 704(b) rules, under which the substantial
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economic effect of a partnership loss allocation is generally
determined by assuming that the loss actually occurs and that it
is actually borne by the partners to whom it is allocated.
To forestall abuse of the generally applicable assumption
that persons obligated to make payments or contributions will
actually perform notwithstanding the inadequacy of their net
worth, the New Regulations include an anti-abuse rule that
suspends the assumption where "the facts and circumstances
indicate a plan to circumvent or avoid [an] obligation." 10 4 The
Regulations contain one example, summarized below, that
illustrates such a plan.1
0 5
Example. A parent corporation desires to acquire an
interest as the sole general partner of a limited
partnership. The parent corporation expects the partnership
to provide an attractive investment and to yield significant
tax losses that the parent can use. To limit its monetary
exposure, the parent forms a subsidiary (which will be
included in the parent's consolidated return) for the sole
purpose of acquiring the partnership interest and capitalizes
the subsidiary with only the funds needed to acquire the
general partner interest. As general partner, the subsidiary
has the legally enforceable obligation, to the extent of its
net worth, to make contributions to the partnership to permit
the partnership to satisfy its unpaid liabilities. The
partnership has one limited partner, which has no obligation
to make contributions to the partnership in excess of its
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initial contribution and which is not liable for its deficit
capital account. The limited partner, however, agrees to
indemnify the partnership's creditor if, but only if, the
creditor has first exhausted its remedies against the
partnership. If the parent corporation had directly acquired
the general partner interest, the parent would have had a net
contribution obligation and, hence, the economic risk of
loss, for the entire partnership liability.1 0 6 However, the
facts that the subsidiary was formed to limit the parent's
liability while providing tax losses to the parent through
its consolidated return, "when considered together with [the
limited partner's] indemnification agreement," indicate a
plan to circumvent or avoid the subsidiary's contribution
obligation. Accordingly, the subsidiary's ostensible net
contribution obligation is ignored and the economic risk of
loss for the partnership's liability falls on the limited
partner, who is deemed to have a net payment obligation to
the extent of its liability under its indemnification
agreement.
As adumbrated by the foregoing example and other examples
contained in the New Regulations, the scope of this anti-abuse
rule seems to embrace situations in which (1) it appears that, for
tax avoidance purposes, one or more partners have undertaken a
contribution or payment obligation that will not, or cannot
practically, be enforced, and (2) if such obligation were not
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enforced, other partners would have payment or contribution
obligations that would be enforced.
In addition, the anti-abuse rule may apply in situations in
which the partners attempt to have debt that is substantively
nonrecourse treated as recourse debt. For example, suppose that,
as in the preceding example, a parent corporation forms a
nominally capitalized single purpose subsidiary to become the sole
general partner of a limited partnership and the partnership
incurs a debt that is nominally a general liability obligation of
the partnership for which the subsidiary/general partner is
personally liable; however, assume that the limited partner has no
indemnification obligation to the creditor. Thus, because the
limited partner has no personal liability for the debt and the
general partner (a nominally capitalized corporate subsidiary) has
no separate assets that the creditor can reach, the debt is
effectively secured only by the partnership's assets. Under the
anti-abuse rule, the net contribution obligation of the general
partner should be ignored and the debt should be treated as a
nonrecourse debt and allocated in accordance with the nonrecourse
liability sharing rules.1
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[f] Time That Net Contribution and Net Payment Obligations
Must Be Satisfied; Effect on Recognition of Obligations
With certain exceptions, contribution or payment obligations
will not be recognized in computing a partner's net contribution
or net payment obligation if the contribution is not required to
be made within a specified time period after the partner's
interest in the partnership is liquidated or such payment is not
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required to be made within a reasonable time after the liability
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to which it relates becomes due. In fact, however, as a result
of the application of the exceptions to this general rule, the
effect of the New Regulations is generally to recognize all
obligations, but value deferred obligations on a discounted basis
to take into account the period between the occurrence of the
triggering event and the time that the obligation is required to
be performed.
Specifically, an obligation to make a payment to a creditor
or other person with respect to a partnership liability is
recognized in full for purposes of computing a partner's net
payment obligation "only to the extent that such obligation is
required to be satisfied within a reasonable period of time after
such partnership liability becomes due and payable."1 0 9 If
satisfaction within a reasonable time is not required under the
terms of the instrument or law giving rise to the payment
obligation, then the obligation is taken into account only to the
extent of its discounted value, as discussed below. No clear
guidance is provided as to what is a reasonable time period. In
general, however, commercially reasonable prerequisites to
performance of a payment obligation should not trigger the
discount rules. For example, a condition that performance under a
guarantee or indemnity agreement is not required until the
creditor exhausts its remedies against the partnership's assets
should not be viewed as imposing an unreasonable delay in the
performance of the guarantor's obligation.
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The issue of what is an unreasonable delay in the time
prescribed for performing a payment obligation is somewhat clouded
by the fact that the constructive liquidation rules assume that at
the time of a constructive liquidation all partnership liabilities
"become due and payable in full because of the partnership's
failure to make the payments required," whether or not the
liabilities would be accelerated by an actual liquidation of the
110partnership. For example, assume that the partnership has a
liability that will become due in ten years or on an earlier
default, but that the debt instrument does not provide for
acceleration of maturity in the event of an earlier liquidation of
the partnership. Assume further that a partner has guaranteed the
liability. It seems the assumption that the liability becomes due
and payable on the day of the constructive liquidation should also
apply to accelerate the time at which the guarantee is deemed to
be enforceable, but the New Regulations are not explicit on this
point.
A contribution obligation is recognized in full:
'only to the extent that such obligation must be satisfied by
the later of--
(A) The end of the partnership taxable year in which
the partner's interest in the partnership is liquidated; or
(B) 90 days after the date of such liquidation."
i l
A partner's interest is treated as liquidated on the earlier of
the date on which the partnership is liquidated or the date on
which the interest is liquidated under Regulation § 1.761-1(d).
1 12
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A partnership is treated as liquidated on the earlier of the date
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on which it terminates under § 708(b)(1)(A), or the date on
which it ceases to be a going concern even though its existence is
continued for purposes of winding up its affairs, paying its debts
and distributing its remaining assets.
11 4
In applying these concepts in the context of a constructive
liquidation, the time at which a partner would be required to
perform a contribution obligation is determined by ascertaining
the time that he would have to perform under the partnership
agreement or applicable law if the partnership actually liquidated
on the date of the constructive liquidation. For example, assume
that a.partner is obligated to make an additional contribution
five years after the date on which his interest in partnership
liabilities is being determined (and, therefore, five years after
the date on which a constructive liquidation is deemed to occur)
and that the obligation would not be accelerated if the
partnership is liquidated sooner. Under these circumstances, the
contribution obligation would not be required to be made within
the prescribed time period and it would be discounted to its
present value.
It is not entirely certain how the New Regulations apply if a
partner's contribution obligation would be immediately payable
upon a liquidation of the partnership but would not be required to
be made if his interest were liquidated on that day under
Regulation § 1.761-1(d). This type of contribution obligation
literally does not satisfy the timing requirement of the New
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Regulations even though the contribution would, in fact, be
required to be made on the date of the constructive liquidation if
the partnership actually liquidated on that date.
1 15
A contribution or payment obligation is not treated as
satisfied by delivery of a promissory note if the maker of the
note is the person required to make the payment or contribution or
a related person, unless the note is readily tradable on an
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established securities market. A contribution obligation
imposed by law is deemed to satisfy the timing requirements of the
New Regulations, apparently without regard to the time that the
law would require performance.
1 1 7
If a payment or contribution obligation fails to meet the
prescribed timing requirements, it is recognized to the extent of
its discounted present value as of the date of the constructive
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liquidation. Under the New Regulations, a deferred obligation
is treated as having a value equal to its principal amount if it
bears interest at a rate that equals or exceeds the applicable
Federal rate (under S 1274(d)) from the date the liability to
which it relates becomes due and payable until the payment
obligation is due. 119If the obligation does not bear adequate
interest, its value is the imputed principal amount that it would
have under § 1274(b) at the time of valuation.
12 0
Accordingly, although a partner's note (or the note of a
related person) is generally not treated as "satisfying" a payment
or contribution obligation, the principal amount of such a note
(if it bears adequate interest) or its imputed principal amount
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(if it does not) is recognized and taken into account as a payment
or contribution obligation under the New Regulations.1
2 1
[6] Examples of Net Payment and Net Contribution Obligations
Upon emerging from the foregoing mouse's eye view of the maze
of rules that determines whether a partner has a net contribution
obligation or a net payment obligation with respect to a
partnership liability, it may help to recall that (1) to the
extent a partner has such a net contribution or net payment
obligation with respect to a partnership liability, he also has a
share of the "economic risk of loss" for the liability; and (2) to
the extent of his share of such economic risk of loss, the
liability is included in the basis of his partnership interest
under § 752. The New Regulations provide a number of helpful
examples that illustrate both the fundamental and esoteric aspects
of the determination of a partner's net contribution and net
payment obligations. The following examples are based
substantially on those contained in the Regulations.
Example 1. Net contribution obligation of equal partners
in a "simple" pro rata general partnership. 12 2 Partners A
and B each contribute $20,000 to form a general partnership.
The partnership purchases property for $100,000, using its
$40,000 of cash equity and incurring a recourse purchase
money liability of $60,000. The partners agree to share all
profits and losses equally. The partnership is so "simple"
that it does not maintain capital accounts or provide for the
restoration of capital account deficits under the substantial
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economic effect safe harbor of Regulation S 1.704-1(b)(2).
Instead, under state law, the partners are obligated to
contribute equally to make up any losses in excess of their
initial capital contributions.
Upon a constructive liquidation, the partnership would
incur a $100,000 loss as the result of a taxable disposition
of its property for no consideration, and its $60,000
liability would become due and payable. Since A and B are
each responsible under state law for one-half of the
partnership's losses, each would be required to contribute
$30,000 to satisfy the liability, and the New Regulations
assume that each will, in fact, perform his contribution
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obligation. Moreover, because neither A nor B has a right
to reimbursement from the other (or a person related to the
other), each has a net contribution obligation of $30,000
with respect to the partnership's liability. Accordingly, A
and B each bear $30,000 of the economic risk of loss for the
partnership's $60,000 liability.
Example 2. Overlapping contribution and Payment
124
obligations in a simple limited partnership. The facts
are the same as in Example 1, except that B is a limited
partner who guarantees the entire $60,000 partnership
liability, but has no obligation to make any additional
contribution to the partnership under the partnership
agreement or state law. In the event of default, the
creditor could proceed directly against the partnership or
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against B as guarantor. If B is required to perform under
the guarantee, he will be subrogated to the creditor's claim
against the partnership in its capacity as primary obligor
for the liability.
Under these circumstances, B has no obligation to make a
contribution to the partnership, but B's guarantee
constitutes an "obligation to make a payment to a creditor or
other person with respect to a partnership liability."
12 5
However, if B performed this payment obligation, he would be
subrogated to the creditor's claim against the partnership.
Accordingly, B would be able to enforce the liability against
the partnership. Since the partnership has no assets, A, as
the sole general partner, would be required to contribute
$60,000 to the partnership to permit it to pay B as subrogee
under the liability. Thus, B would be entitled to full
126
reimbursement for his payment under the guarantee, and B
would have no net payment obligation with respect to the
liability. Consequently, B would have no economic risk of
loss for the liability. A, on the other hand, would have no
right to reimbursement for his $60,000 contribution
obligation. Accordingly, A has a net contribution obligation
and the resultant economic risk of loss for the entire
$60,000 partnership liability. 127
Example 3. Economic risk of loss not shared in
proportion to partners' interests in partnership losses.
1 2 8
The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that (1) the
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partnership agreement provides that net taxable loss will be
allocated 90 percent to A and 10 percent to B, and (2) the
partnership agreement provides, in accordance with the
5 704(b) Regulations, that capital accounts will be properly
determined and maintained for the partners, distributions in
liquidation of the partnership will be made to satisfy the
partners' positive capital account balances, and any partner
having a deficit capital account balance will be required to
restore such balance on liquidation.
As in Example 1, upon a constructive liquidation, the
partnership would incur a $100,000 loss. This loss would be
allocated 90 percent to A and 10 percent to B. The effect on








Under these facts, A would be required to make a net
contribution equal to the $70,000 deficit balance in his
capital account. B, on the other hand, would have no
contribution obligation, but would have the right to receive
a distribution of $10,000 in satisfaction of his positive
capital account.
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Under the New Regulations, $60,000 of A's $70,000 net
contribution obligation would be a net contribution "with
respect to" the partnership liability; the $10,000 remainder
would be made to satisfy B's positive capital account.1
2 9
Accordingly, A has the economic risk of loss for the entire
$60,000 partnership liability. Significantly, even though B
is allocated 10 percent of partnership losses, he has no
economic risk of loss for the partnership's liability under
the facts of this Example. Because B's share of the putative
$100,000 partnership loss is borne entirely out of his
initial capital contribution, he will not bear any loss
attributable to the $60,000 liability.130"
Example 4. Net payment obligations resulting from
guarantees and indemnities in a simple limited
partnership. 1 3 1 C and D form a limited partnership with C as
the general partner and D as the limited partner. Each
contributes $10,000. The partnership purchases real property
for $100,000, making a $20,000 down payment and giving the
seller a promissory note for $80,000 secured by a mortgage on
the property. Except for the its rights against the property
under the mortgage, the seller has no recourse against the
partnership; however, C, the general partner, guarantees the
payment of the promissory note. If the partnership defaults
on the note and C performs on the guarantee, he will be
subrogated to the seller's claim against the real property
under the mortgage, but he will have no rights as subrogee
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against other partnership property or the partners. D, the
limited partner, does not guarantee the partnership's note,
but enters into a separate agreement to indemnify C for
one-half of any amount that C is required to pay under the
guarantee.
All partnership losses are allocated to C, the general
partner. The partnership agreement complies with the
alternative test for economic effect in the § 704(b)
Regulations.
In the event of a constructive liquidation of the
partnership, the real property is deemed to become worthless
and the $80,000 partnership liability under the promissory
note is deemed to become due and payable. Moreover, the
partnership is treated as disposing of the real property to
the creditor in a taxable transaction for no consideration
other than "relief from any liability for which the
creditor's right to repayment is limited to one or more
assets of the partnership. . . .,132 In determining whether
a creditor's right to repayment is limited to partnership
assets, any rights the creditor has to receive net payments
from the partners are disregarded.13 3 Accordingly, because
the seller has no right to be satisfied by contribution from
the partners (but only to be satisfied through C's payment
obligation under the guarantee), the seller's right to
repayment is limited to partnership assets, and the
partnership is treated as realizing the full amount of the
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liability upon the constructive disposition of the real
property to the seller. In this transaction, the partnership
realizes a $20,000 loss.
The entire $20,000 loss is allocated to C, creating a
$10,000 deficit balance in his capital account. While C is
obligated to contribute $10,000 to the partnership to
eliminate this deficit balance, the proceeds of the
contribution must be applied by the partnership to satisfy
the $10,000 positive balance in D's capital account and not
to pay the partnership liability. Thus, C's $10,000 net
contribution obligation is not "with respect to" the
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liability. Consequently, C has no economic risk of loss
as a result of this net contribution obligation.
However, C is obligated under the guarantee to pay the
seller the full difference between the $80,000 liability and
the assumed zero value of the real property. This obligation
is a payment obligation with respect to the liability. 1 3 5 As
a result, however, of D's agreement to indemnify C for
one-half of D's loss under the guarantee, C is entitled to be
reimbursed1 3 6 by D for $40,000 of the $80,000 payment under
the guarantee. Thus, C has a $40,000 net payment obligation
($80,000 payment obligation, less right to reimbursement of
$40,000). C's total economic risk of loss with respect to
the $80,000 liability is therefore $40,000.
D has no direct contribution or payment obligation.
However, D is required to reimburse C for $40,000 of the
-60-
$80,000 that C is required to pay under the guarantee. Under
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the New Regulations, a partner has a payment obligation
with respect to a partnership liability to the extent that he
or she is obligated to make a payment to another partner with
respect to any payment to a partnership creditor by the other
partner. Thus, D's obligation to indemnify C is a net
payment obligation (D has no right to be reimbursed for such
indemnification payment), and D has a $40,000 economic risk
of loss for the partnership's $80,000 liability.
It is noteworthy that the economic risk of loss in this
example is borne equally by C and D, even though the
partnership agreement purports to allocate partnership losses
solely to C. Thus, if the allocation scheme is respected for
§ 704(b) purposes, the result, contrary to the purpose of the
New Regulations, is that partnership recourse liabilities are
allocated in a manner that differs from the allocation of
correlative losses under § 704(b). This discontinuity
suggests that the loss allocation scheme is defective under
the § 704(b) rules. A consistent answer under both the
§ 704(b) and the S 752 rules can be achieved if the guarantee
and indemnity agreements are treated as part of the
partnership agreement for purposes of S 704(b) and
partnership losses in excess of the partners' aggregate




There is some potential in this type of situation for
taxpayers to whipsaw themselves. Assume that after several
years the partnership has realized actual losses of $60,000,
all of which are attributable to depreciation and all of
which have been allocated to C under the agreement. No
principal has been paid to the seller. At this point, the
partnership's balance sheet is as follows:
Assets Liabilities and Capital





Total Assets $40,000 and Capital $40,000
Upon a constructive liquidation, the partnership would be
treated as realizing a gain of $40,000 upon a constructive
disposition of the real property to the seller in
satisfaction of his note. Assuming the partnership contains
a normal chargeback provision under which the first profits
are allocated to offset any prior losses, this gain would be
allocated entirely to C, producing a $10,000 deficit balance
in his capital account. As before, the $10,000 that C is
obligated to contribute to restore this deficit balance will
be paid to D to satisfy his positive capital account balance
and hence C's contribution obligation is not "with respect to
the seller's note." Examination of the guarantee and
indemnification arrangements outside the partnership leads to
the conclusion, as before, that C and D each have a net
payment obligation of $40,000 with respect to the seller's
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note. Inclusion of C's $40,000 share of this liability in
his basis along with his $10,000 capital contribution reveals
that $10,000 of the $60,000 losses allocated to him should
have been suspended under S 704(d). These suspended losses
should be triggered when C contributes $10,000 to permit the
partnership to satisfy D's positive capital account.
Example 5. Economic risk of loss where liability is
secured, in part, by pledge of contributed property used
solely to secure such liability. 1 39 E and F form a general
partnership. E contributes $60,000 in cash and F contributes
$15,000. The partnership purchases a building for a $30,000
down payment and a $70,000 recourse loan from an unrelated
lender. The "extra" $45,000 that E contributes is deposited
in an escrow account that is pledged to the lender to secure
the purchase money debt for the building. Under the
partnership agreement, partnership income and loss will
generally be shared equally by the partners, except that
income from the escrow account will be allocated 95 percent
to E and 5 percent to F. Capital accounts are maintained in
accordance with the 5 704(b) Regulations and each partner is
liable to restore his deficit capital account on liquidation
of his interest.
Under the New Regulations, if contributed property is
used solely to secure a partnership liability, the
partnership's obligation to use the property to discharge the
liability is treated as an obligation of the contributing
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partner to make a payment to the creditor. Moreover, on a
constructive liquidation, any such property is not deemed to
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become worthless. Instead, the property is treated as
transferred in complete or partial satisfaction of the
liability.
Accordingly, on a constructive liquidation of the
partnership, the building would be deemed to become
worthless, while the $45,000 escrow account would not be
treated as worthless, but would be treated as transferred in
partial satisfaction of the $70,000 partnership liability.
On a deemed disposition of the building for no consideration,
the resulting $100,000 partnership loss would be allocated





Less: loss (50,000) (50,000)
Capital accounts after
constructive liquidation S10.000 (S35,000)
The transfer of the $45,000 escrow account to the
creditor is treated as a payment to the creditor by E;
however, E's right to receive a $10,000 distribution from the
partnership is a right to be reimbursed for such payment.
Accordingly, E has a net payment obligation of $35,000.
F, on the other hand, is obligated to make a
contribution to the partnership of $35,000 to satisfy his
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deficit capital account liability. This contribution
obligation is allocated to the partnership liability only to
the extent it does not exceed "the outstanding partnership
indebtedness with respect to that liability." 14 2 The
outstanding indebtedness with respect to the partnership
liability is $35,000 (original liability of $70,000,
decreased by $45,000 deemed payment by transfer of the escrow
account, increased by E's right to a $10,000 reimbursement
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for a portion of such deemed payment). Thus, F has a net
contribution obligation with respect to the liability of
$35,000. Accordingly, E and F each have a $35,000 economic
risk of loss for the partnership's $70,000 liability.
Example 6. Economic risk of loss with respect to a
partnership liability that is secured only by a pledoe of a
partner's note and by partnership assets. 144 G and H form a
general partnership, with G contributing $125,000 cash and H
contributing $25,000 cash and his promissory note in the
principal amount of $100,000. H's note is payable in five
years and bears interest in excess of the applicable Federal
rate. Under its terms, the note is not accelerated on a
liquidation of the partnership during its five year term.
The partnership buys a building for $1,000,000, paying
$150,000 in cash and giving the seller a partnership
promissory note for $850,000, secured solely by the building
and a pledge of H's promissory note. Partnership income and
loss are allocated and capital accounts are maintained in
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accordance with the § 704(b) Regulations and the partners are
generally liable to restore their deficit capital accounts on
liquidation of their interests, except that, during the term
of his promissory note, H is not required to restore the
first $100,000 of his deficit capital account.
Common sense indicates, under these facts, that H should
bear the economic risk of loss for the $100,000 portion of
the liability to the seller that is secured by his promissory
note and that the $750,000 balance, which is secured only by
partnership property, should be a nonrecourse liability. In
this case common sense is right, but the path to this answer
under the New Regulations is tortured.
On a constructive liquidation, the partnership's
liability of $850,000 is deemed to become due and payable and
the building with a basis of $1,000,000 is deemed to become
worthless; however, H's promissory note is not a partnership
asset for purposes of the constructive liquidation rules.
14 5
Accordingly, it is not deemed to become worthless.
In addition, on a constructive liquidation, the
partnership is treated as disposing of the presumptively
worthless building. In this constructive disposition, the
partnership is treated as realizing only that portion of the
$850,000 liability as to which the creditor's right to
repayment is limited to partnership assets. 14 6 For this
purpose, a liability is one for which the creditor's right to
repayment is limited to partnership assets only to the extent
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that the balance of the liability exceeds the amount that the
partners would have to contribute to satisfy the liability on
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a constructive liquidation. H's obligation to make a
contribution pursuant to his promissory note is recognized
only to the extent of the discounted present value of the
note, because the note is not accelerated on a liquidation of
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the partnership. Because the note bears interest at or
above the applicable Federal rate, it is deemed to have a
value equal to its face amount of $100,000. Accordingly,
$750,000 of the total liability of $850,000 is treated as
payable only out of partnership assets, and the partnership
is treated as realizing $750,000 on the constructive sale of
the building. Since the building has a basis of $1,000,000,
the partnership recognizes a $250,000 loss on the sale. The





Less: loss (125,000) (125,000)
Capital accounts-after
constructive liquidation $0 (S1001000)
H's obligation to restore his $100,000 deficit capital
account is governed by his promissory note. Even though the
note is not accelerated by the liquidation, it is
nevertheless deemed to have a value of $100,000 because it
bears adequate interest. Accordingly, H is treated as having
-67-
a contribution obligation of $100,000 for which he is not
entitled to reimbursement. The partnership's "indebtedness
with respect to the liability" for the loan is $100,000
(total liability of $850,000, decreased by $750,000 portion
as to which the creditor's right to repayment is limited to
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partnership assets). Thus, H has a net contribution
obligation of $100,000 for the partnership's $100,000
indebtedness with respect to the $850,000 liability.
Accordingly, H has a $100,000 economic risk of loss for the
partnership's liability. G has no payment or contribution
obligation under the facts of a constructive liquidation.
Accordingly, he has no economic risk of loss. The $750,000
portion of the partnership's liability as to which no partner
has the economic risk of loss is a nonrecourse liability.
[7] Nonrecourse Partnership Liabilities Held by a Partner or
Related Person
[a] General
If a partner (or a related person) holds a partnership
liability that would otherwise be treated as a nonrecourse
liability under the New Regulations, a special rule transmutes the
liability into a recourse liability and allocates the entire risk
of loss to the partner who holds it or with respect to whom the
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holder is a related person. This rule has no application to a
liability owed to a partner if the liability is otherwise a
recourse partnership liability (i.e., a liability as to which the
partners have the economic risk of loss under the general net
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payment and net contribution rules discussed in 1 8.03[4] and
8.03[51 above). Furthermore, this rule only applies if the
partner-held nonrecourse liability is, in fact, a liability for
tax purposes and is not disguised equity.
15 1
The scope of this special rule is considerably broadened by
the fact that it applies to nonrecourse partnership liabilities
held by "related persons" to partners.
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[b] De Minimis Rule
The New Regulations include a very significant "de minimis"
rule, under which a partner will not be treated as bearing the
economic risk of loss for an otherwise nonrecourse partnership
liability held by such partner (or a related person) if
"(A) The partner's interest (including the interest of
any person related to such partner) in each item of
partnership income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit is 10
percent or less; and
(B) Such loan constitutes qualified nonrecourse
financing within the meaning of section 465(b)(6).
15 3
Under this exception, an otherwise nonrecourse loan from an
institutional lender to a partnership may be treated as a
nonrecourse loan (that is, the lender or a related person-partner
will not be treated as having the economic risk of loss for such
loan) even if the lender (or a related person) is a partner, so
long as the aggregate interest of the lender (and all related
persons) in each partnership item is 10 percent or less.
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The de minimis rule is very helpful in structuring
participating loans in connection with real estate
transactions. 15 4 A pervasive concern in structuring such loans is
the risk that the putative lender will be treated as a partner
rather than a creditor for tax purposes. 15 5  If the "lender" is
treated as a partner, the tax benefits anticipated by the
"borrower" are likely to be substantially diminished; the lender
may also have adverse tax consequences. The concern that the
lender may be treated as a partner is usually exacerbated by the
lender's desire to have management rights and powers in excess of
those normally held by a conventional lender in order to protect
his participation rights.
The de minimis rule provides a tool to minimize the risk that
the lender will be treated as a partner in this type of situation,
provided the lender is a qualified lender for purposes of
§ 465(b)(6).1 5 6  Instead of simply structuring the deal as a
participating loan, the lender's position is bifurcated as
follows:
(a) The lender (or a related person) forms a partnership
with the would-be borrower. This partnership becomes the borrower
and owner of the property that is to be encumbered by the loan.
The partnership agreement gives the lender (or a related person),
in his capacity as a partner, the management rights and powers
desired by the lender. A portion (not in excess of a 10%




(b) The lender makes a participating, commercially
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reasonable, nonrecourse loan to the partnership, secured by the
partnership's property. The loan documents do not give the lender
any control or management rights other than those normally
included in conventional nonparticipating loans. The lender's
participation rights under the loan are reduced as necessary to
reflect the economic rights held by the lender (or a related
person) through the partnership.
By separating the management rights and powers from the loan,
the suggested structure should significantly reduce the likelihood
that the lender will be treated as a partner with respect to the
loan portion of the transaction.
[c] Wrapped Indebtedness
An otherwise nonrecourse partnership liability that is held
by a partner (or related person) may include or reflect an
underlying obligation ("wrapped indebtedness") owed by the partner
(or related person) to another creditor. In this situation, if
the wrapped indebtedness encumbers partnership property the
partnership is treated as having two liabilities: a debt directly
to the holder of the wrapped indebtedness, and a debt to the
partner (or related person) who holds the "wrapping" indebtedness
in an amount equal to the difference between the amount of the
wrapping indebtedness and the amount of the wrapped
indebtedness. 159
Example 1. A partner owns property that is encumbered
by a nonrecourse liability to an unrelated third party of
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$200,000. The partner sells the property to the partnership
for $300,000 receiving a down payment of $60,000. The
partnership pays the $240,000 balance of the purchase price
by taking the property subject to the existing $200,000 first
mortgage (the partnership will directly service the $200,000
mortgage) and giving the selling partner a nonrecourse note
of the partnership for the remaining $40,000, secured by a
second mortgage on the property. Under these circumstances,
the partnership has two obligations, one to the holder of the.
$200,000 note secured by the first mortgage and one to the
selling partner for $40,000, secured by the second mortgage.
No partner has any economic risk of loss for the $200,000
liability. The $40,000 liability is a partner nonrecourse
debt owed to the selling partner. The selling partner bears
the economic risk of loss for this liability. In this
Example, there is no wrapped indebtedness.
Example 2. The facts are the same as in Example 1,
except that the partnership does not agree to directly
service the first mortgage. Instead, the partnership gives
the selling partner a nonrecourse note for $240,000 that is
secured by a second "all-inclusive" mortgage. The selling
partner is required to service the first mortgage note of
$200,000 from the payments received from the partnership.
Under these circumstances, the $240,000 partnership note
"wraps" the $200,000 first mortgage note. Thus, the $200,000
first mortgage note is a wrapped indebtedness.
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Because the partnership is treated as having a direct
obligation to the holder of the wrapped indebtedness, the
results are the same as in Example 1. No partner (including
the selling partner) has any economic risk of loss for the
$200,000 wrapped indebtedness, even though the wrapped
indebtedness is "reflected in" the $240,000 partnership
liability to the selling partner. The $40,000 portion of the
$240,000 liability to the selling partner that is in excess
of the wrapped indebtedness is a partner-held nonrecourse
liability of the partnership, as to which the selling partner
bears the economic risk of loss.
1 6 0
[8] Tiered Partnerships
Two special rules bear on the application of the economic
risk of loss rules to situations involving partnerships in which
other partnerships are partners ("tiered partnership" situations).
First, if a partnership (an "upper-tier partnership") holds an
interest in another partnership ( a "subsidiary partnership"), the
upper-tier partnership's liabilities are treated as including its
liablites.161
share of the subsidiary partnership's liabilities. Thus, the
partners of the upper-tier partnership include in the bases of
their interests in the upper-tier partnership their allocable
portions of the subsidiary partnership's liabilities.
Second, an upper-tier partnership's share of the economic
risk of loss for a subsidiary partnership's liabilities is
determined under a two-step approach. The normal rules are first
applied to determine what the upper-tier partnership's economic
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risk of loss for subsidiary partnership liabilities would be if
the special tier partnership rules were inapplicable.1 6 2  Then,
the upper-tier partnership is also treated as bearing the economic
risk of loss for any of the subsidiary partnership's liabilities
that are not allocated to it in the first step to the extent the
upper-tier partnership's partners would bear the economic risk of
loss for such liabilities if such liabilities were direct
liabilities of the upper-tier partnership.
1 63
Example. An upper-tier partnership is the sole general
partner of a subsidiary limited partnership. No limited
partner of the subsidiary partnership is obligated to make
any additional contribution to the subsidiary partnership or
to make any payment with respect to the subsidiary
partnership's liabilities. The subsidiary-partnership has
two liabilities, a full recourse liability of $100 and a
liability of $200 for which the subsidiary has pledged
property, but has not assumed general liability. A ten
percent partner of the upper-tier partnership has guaranteed
both of the subsidiary partnership's liabilities.
Applying the economic risk of loss rules, the upper-tier
partnership has a net contribution obligation for, and
directly bears the economic risk of loss with respect to, the
164
$100 full recourse liability. Under the normal rules,
however, the upper-tier partnership would not bear the
economic risk of loss for the subsidiary's $200 liability
that is secured only by a pledge of the subsidiary's assets
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and a guarantee by a ten-percent partner of the upper-tier
partnership, because the upper-tier partnership and that
partner are not "related persons." However, if the $200
liability were a liability of the upper-tier partnership, the
partner who guaranteed it would have a net payment obligation
with respect to such liability and, therefore, would bear the
economic risk of loss for it. Accordingly, under the special
tier partnership rules the upper-tier partnership has the
economic risk of loss for both of the subsidiary
partnership's liabilities.
1 6 5
The New Regulations provide that a liability can be taken
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into account only once for § 752 purposes. In the context of
tier partnerships this limitation prevents a person who is a
partner in both an upper-tier partnership and a subsidiary
partnership from including the same liability of the subsidiary in
the bases of his interests in both the upper-tier partnership and
the subsidiary partnership. In this type of situation, the
liabilities apparently should be apportioned to the partner's
respective bases in the upper-tier and subsidiary partnerships in
proportion to the economic risk of loss that he bears as a partner
of each partnership. Thus, a partner's economic risk of loss in
the subsidiary partnership should be computed, first, as if he
were not a partner in the upper-tier partnership. Subsidiary
partnership liabilities should be allocated to his basis in the
subsidiary partnership to the extent of the resulting economic
risk of loss. Then, his economic risk of loss should be computed
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for the upper-tier partnership using the tier partnership rules.
Any resulting indirect increase in his risk of loss for subsidiary
partnership liabilities over his economic risk of loss as a direct
partner of the subsidiary partnership should be allocated to his
basis in the upper-tier partnership.
[10] Overlapping Economic Risk of Loss
The New Regulations anticpate the possibility that the
aggregate amount of economic risk of loss that all of the partners
are determined to bear for a partnership liability may exceed the
aggregate amount of the liability. Under these circumstances,
the economic risk of loss borne by each partner with
respect to such liability ... shall equal the amount
determined by multiplying the amount of such liability
... by the fraction obtained by dividing the amount of
economic risk of loss that such partner is determined to
bear with respect to that liability ... under the first
sentence of this paragraph (d)(3)(i) by the sum of such
amounts for all partners.
1 6 7
While apportionment of the economic risk of loss for a partnership
liability makes sense where the partners would otherwise be
treated as bearing an aggregate economic risk of loss that exceeds
the liability, such a situation is likely to occur only as a
result of sloppy legal work or an advertent effort to subvert the
economic risk of loss rules. This is because, under the normal
application of the rules, a partner has the economic risk of loss
for a partnership liability only if he is the last person in the
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chain of partners (and related persons) who would be required to
make a contribution to pay the liability, pay the liability
directly, or reimburse another partner (or related person) for
such a contribution or payment. In order for the partners'
aggregate economic risks of loss, determined under these rules, to
exceed the amount of the liability, it is necessary for the
economic arrangement of the partners to contain an economic
discontinuity under which, depending on external events, the last
person in the chain may not always be the same person.
Example. The only liability of a two-person limited
partnership is a $100 loan from a bank. Under the terms of
the loan and the partnership agreement, the bank can proceed
to collect the loan directly from the partnership. If the
partnership's assets are insufficient to satisfy the loan,
the general partner is obligated to contribute funds to pay
the difference. The limited partner has no obligation
whatsoever to make any further contributions to the
partnership. Moreover, the general partner has no direct or
indirect right of reimbursement from the limited partner.
Thus, the general partner apparently has the economic risk of
loss for the entire $100 loan.
The limited partner, however, has guaranteed the loan.
Under the guarantee agreement, the bank can proceed directly
against the limited partner as guarantor without exhausting
its remedies against the partnership and, in an unusual
twist, the limited partner would not be subrogated to the
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bank's claim against the partnership if the limited partner
is required to pay the bank under the guarantee. Moreover,
payment by the limited partner under the guarantee is not
treated as a capital contribution and, hence, such payment
does not increase the limited partner's capital account.
Thus, applying the normal rules, the limited partner would be
treated as having a net payment obligation of $100 and the
economic risk of loss for the entire partnership liability.
Under these facts, the bank has a choice of remedies --
it can proceed against the partnership, in which case the
general partner is solely responsible for the loan, or it can
proceed against the limited partner, in which case the
limited partner holds the proverbial bag. Thus, depending on
the whim of the bank, responsibility for the loan, in the
event of a constructive liquidation, can fall entirely on
either of the partners, and under the New Regulations the
economic risk of loss for the liability is, therefore,
apportioned between them.
16 8
What is unusual about the preceding example is not that the
general partner is generally liable to make contributions to pay
partnership obligations or that the limited partner guaranteed a
specific obligation. Those things happen frequently, but when
they do, the partners generally structure the agreements so that a
creditor's selection of a collection option will not affect their
rights and obligations, as among themselves, for the liability.
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As suggested above, permitting the lender to choose who will
bear the final loss for a partnership liability inserts a
potential for economic randomness in a transaction that generally
reflects either poor coordination of the documents or an effort to
play games with the S 752 rules. If the taxpayers cannot prove
that the such randomness was not part of a plan to circumvent of
avoid the § 752 rules, the IRS may disregard the ostensible
economic risk of loss borne by the partner who benefits tax-wise
169
from the arrangement. If, however, the randomness is not tax
motivated, the Regulations provide for the economic risk of loss
for a liability to be shared in proportion to partners's economic
risk of loss, as determined under the nromal application of the
rules.
8.04 Sharing Nonrecourse Liabilities
[1] General
The New Regulations define "nonrecourse liability" by
exclusion. A nonrecourse liability is simply any "liability of
the partnership to the extent, but only to the extent, that no
partner bears the economic risk of loss." 1 70 By adopting this
definitional approach, the New Regulations assume that all
partnership liabilities will be allocated among the partners under
either the recourse sharing rules discussed in 8.03 above or the
nonrecourse sharing rules discussed in this 1 8.04.
In general, a partner's share of partnership nonrecourse
liabilities is the sum of --
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(1) the partner's share of partnership minimum gain,
(2) the amount of gain that the partner would recognize
under § 704(c), or in the same manner as under § 704(c) in
connection with a revaluation of partnership property
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pursuant to the S 704(b) Regulations, if the partnership
disposed of property in a taxable transaction in full
satisfaction of such liabilities and for no further
consideration; and
(3) the partner's proportionate share of the "excess
nonrecourse liabilities " of the partnership.
1 7 2
This scheme for allocating nonrecourse liabilities effectively
coordinates the liability allocation rules of S 752 with the
income and loss allocation rules of § 704(b) in an entirely
sensible manner. To the extent a partner receives an allocation
of nonrecourse deductions or a distribution of nonrecourse
liability proceeds that increases the partner's share of
partnership minimum gain, 17 3 the increase in minimum gain
"attracts" an equal amount of available nonrecourse liabilities
into the basis of the partner's interest so that, to the maximum
extent possible, the partner has sufficient basis in his
partnership interest to claim a current deduction for such
nonrecourse deductions under § 704(d) or receive such distribution
without recognizing gain under § 731.
[2] Coordinating Shares of Nonrecourse Deductions With
Shares of Minimum Gain
A partner's share of partnership minimum gain generally is
determined in accordance with the § 704(b) Regulations.
17 4
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However if it is necessary to compute a partner's interest in
partnership nonrecourse liabilities during a partnership taxable
year, his interest in minimum gain is computed "as if the
partnership taxable year had ended immediately prior to such
determination." 1 75 Furthermore, for purposes of applying the
§ 752 rules, any increase in a partner's share of minimum gain is
treated as occurring immediately before the event that causes the
increase. 176 This timing rule assures that the basis increase
attributable to an allocation or distribution that increases
minimum gain is available to the partner in determining the tax
consequences of such allocation or distribution.
[3] Excess Nonrecourse Liabilities
The "excess nonrecourse liabilities" of a partnership is an
amount equal to the excess of the aggregate partnership
nonrecourse liabilities over the sum of the nonrecourse
liabilities that are allocated to the partners (a) in an amount
equal to their shares of minimum gain, and (b) in an amount equal
balaces.177
to their § 704(c) (and § 704(c) equivalent) balances. Thus,
excess nonrecourse liabilities represent the residual balance of
partnership nonrecourse liabilities. They are allocated among the
partners in proportion to their interests in partnership
profits.
17 8
The determination of the partners' interests in partnership
profits is generally determined by reference to "all facts and
circumstances relating to the economic arrangement of the
partners." 17 9 Under a special dispensation, however, the partners
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may specify their respective interests in partnership profits in
the partnership agreement and the interests so specified will be
respected if they are "reasonably consistent with allocations
(which have substantial economic effect under S 1.704-1(b)) of
some significant item of income or gain among such partners.'
18 0
Example (22) of New Regulation § 1.752-1T(k) makes clear that the
partnership is not required to have the specified items of income
or gain in the taxable year with respect to which excess
nonrecourse deductions are being allocated if there is a
"reasonable likelihood that over the partnership's life it will
recognize [significant] amounts of [such] income and gain." In
Example (22), the partners' initial sharing ratio is 10:90, with a
"flip-flop" to 50:50 after an earn-out period. The agreement
adopts the residual 50:50 ratio for sharing excess nonrecourse
deductions. Under the facts of the Example, there is a reasonable
likelihood that the partnership will be successful enough that the
flip-flop will occur and significant items of income and gain will
eventually be allocated equally between the partners.
Accordingly, the adoption of the 50:50 ratio for sharing excess
nonrecourse deductions is respected from the outset.
No guidance is provided as to what level of probability
constitutes a "reasonable likelihood." In the facts of the
example, the 50:50 ratio becomes operative as soon as the
partnership has a single dollar of net profit (that is, as soon as
it has recouped all prior net losses, if any). No indication is
given as to the likelihood that the partnership will ever generate
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net profits or whether the 50:50 ratio would have been respected
if the partnership had been a high-risk venture with a high
probability of failure. The "reasonable likelihood" standard
appears only in Example (22) and not in the operative language of
the Regulation. Therefore, while partners can safely adopt a
profit ratio that satisfies the reasonable likelihood standard,
other specified ratios may be respected as long as they correspond
to the sharing ratios applicable to a significant item of income
or gain, provided such ratio is likely to come into play if the
partnership is successful.
The largesse of the New Regulations in permitting partners
broad latitude to specify their interests in excess nonrecourse
liabilities is more apparent than real. In most situations, the
partners will be indifferent as to how excess nonrecourse
liabilities are shared, because they will need the basis provided
by such liabilities only to "cover" allocations of nonrecourse
deductions or distributions attributable to nonrecourse debt.
There are, to be sure, exceptions. For example, if a partner with
a zero basis in his partnership interest receives a distribution
of money that does not increase minimum gain, he may need a share
of the partnership's excess nonrecourse liabilities to avoid
recognizing gain on the distribution under § 731.
The following example illustrates the determination of the
partners' shares of partnership nonrecourse liabilities in a
situation involving nonrecourse deductions.1
8 1
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Example. GP and LP form a limited partnership. GP, the
general partner, contributes $20,000, and LP, the limited
partner, contributes $180,000. The partnership purchases a
building for $1,000,000, paying $200,000 in cash and giving a
promissory note in the principal amount of $800,000. The
note is secured solely by a mortgage on the building.
Neither the partnership nor any partner has any personal
liability on the note in any capacity. The partnership
agreement generally provides for partnership income and loss
to be allocated and capital accounts to be maintained in
accordance with the economic effect rules of the § 704(b)
Regulations, and the partners are obligated to restore any
deficit balances in their capital accounts on liquidation of
their interests. In addition, the partnership agreement
contains a minimum gain chargeback provision in accordance
with the 5 704(b) Regulations.
The partnership agreement further provides that, except
as required by the minimum gain chargeback provision, (1) all
partnership items will be allocated 10 percent to GP and 90
percent to LP until the partnership recognizes items of
income and gain equal to all items of loss and deduction, and
(2) thereafter all items will be allocated equally between
the partners. Finally, the agreement provides that, for
purposes of sharing excess nonrecourse liabilities, the
partners will be deemed to have equal interests in
partnership profits. This specified sharing ratio is
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consistent with the manner in which the partners will share
items of income and gain after the initial '110:90"t phase.
Moreover, there is a reasonable likelihood that the
partnership will recognize significant items of income and
gain that will be allocated equally between the partners.
Accordingly, the 50:50 profits interests specified by the
agreement for sharing excess nonrecourse deductions are
respected. 182
In each of the partnership's first two taxable years, it
has rental income of $95,000, operating expenses of $10,000,
interest expense of $80,000 and depreciation of $90,000,
resulting in a taxable loss of $85,000. Under the agreement,
each year's $85,000 loss is allocated 10 percent to GP and 90
percent to LP. In the aggregate, therefore, GP is allocated
losses of $17,000 and LP is allocated losses of $153,000 in
the first two years.
Since the basis of the building is $820,000 at the end
of year 2 (original cost of $1,000,000, less aggregate
depreciation of $180,0000), while the nonrecourse liability
remains $800,000, the partnership would not recognize gain if
it disposed of the building at the end of year 2 for no
consideration other than relief of the nonrecourse liability.
Accordingly, through the end of year 2, the partnership has
183
no nonrecourse deductions and no minimum gain. In the
absence of minimum gain, the entire nonrecourse liability is
an "excess nonrecourse liability." 1 84 Excess nonrecourse
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liabilities are shared in proportion to each "partner's
percentage interest in partnership profits."'1 85 The partners
have validly determined that their interests in partnership
profits, for § 752 purposes, will be deemed to be equal.
18 6
Therefore, at the end of years 1 and 2, each partner's
interest in nonrecourse liabilities is $400,000.
The partnership's operating results are the same for
year 3 as for years 1 and 2 ($95,000 rent, $10,000 expenses,
$80,0000 interest expense, $90,000 depreciation deduction,
yielding a taxable loss of $85,000). The plot thickens,
however, because the $90,000 depreciation deduction in year 3
causes the partnership to have a $70,000 minimum gain at the
end of year 3 ($820,000 basis at the end of year 2, minus
$90,000 year 3 depreciation, produces a basis of $730,000 at
the end of year 3, which is $70,000 less than the nonrecourse
encumbrance). $70,000 of the year 3 depreciation deduction
constitutes nonrecourse deduction. 187
Pursuant to the partnership agreement all partnership
items, including the $70,000 of nonrecourse deductions, are
allocated 10 percent to GP and 90 percent to LP. The
allocation of all items other than the nonrecourse deductions
has substantial economic effect under the § 704(b)
Regulations. The allocation of the nonrecourse deductions is
"deemed to be made in accordance with the partners' interest
in the partnership." 18 8 The impact of these allocations on
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Less: loss in years
1 and 2 (17,000) (153,000)
Less: loss in year 3
(without regard to
nonrecourse deductions (1,500) (13,500)
Less: nonrecourse deductions
in year 3 (7,000) (63,000)
Capital account at end of year 3 ($5,500) ($49,500)
At the end of year 3, GP's share of minimum gain is $7,000
and LP's share is $63,000.189
Pursuant to the New Regulations, partnership nonrecourse
liabilities are allocated first to the partners to the extent
of their respective shares of minimum gain. Accordingly, at
the end of year 3, GP and LP are allocated $7,000 and
$63,000, respectively, of the partnership's nonrecourse
liabilities to match their shares of minimum gain. The
remaining $730,000 of nonrecourse liabilities constitute
excess nonrecourse liabilities that are allocated equally
between the partners in accordance with the specified profit
GP,
sharing ratios. Therefore, at the end of year 3, Gs share
of nonrecourse liabilities is $372,000 ($7,000 share to match
minimum gain and $365,000 share of excess), and LP's share is
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$428,000 ($63,000 share to match minimum gain and $365,000
share of excess).
[4] Effect of Section 704(c)-Type Built-In Gain
Just as a partner's share of minimum gain "attracts" an equal
share of partnership nonrecourse liabilities under the New
Regulations, the New Regulations also provide that a portion of a
partner's share of built-in gain under section 704(c) 19 0 and the
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"§ 704(c) equivalent" rules of the § 704(b) Regulations
attracts partnership nonrecourse deductions. Specifically, a
partner's share of nonrecourse liabilities includes an amount of
such liabilities that equals --
"The amount of any taxable gain that would be allocated to
the partner under section 704(c), or in the same manner as
under section 704(c) in connection with a revaluation of
property pursuant to § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(!) or (L) , if
the partnership disposed of (in a taxable transaction) all
partnership property subject to one or more nonrecourse
liabilities of the partnership in full satisfaction of such
liabilities and for no other consideration. . 192
The rule allocating nonrecourse deductions to a partner to
the extent of his share of such built-in gain is necessary because
minimum gain is computed by reference to the book value of
partnership property as determined for § 704(b) capital account
13
maintenance purposes. Under this rule, a partnership will have
no minimum gain with respect to property subject to a nonrecourse
liability even though the liability exceeds the adjusted tax basis
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of the property, so long as it does not exceed the book value of
194
the property. The New Regulations assure, to the maximum
extent possible, that a partner will have a sufficient share of
nonrecourse liabilities under § 752 to cover his share of the
difference between the book value and the tax basis of the
encumbered property (i.e., his share of the "quasi-minimum gain").
Example. In exchange for a one percent interest in
partnership capital, profits and losses, a partner
contributes to a partnership property with a basis of $60 and
a value of $100, subject to a $99 nonrecourse liability. The
property is properly entered on the partnership's books for
capital accounting purposes at a value of $100, and the
partner's capital account is credited with the $1 net,value
of his contribution. Because the $100 book value of the
property exceeds the $99 nonrecourse liability secured by the
property, the partnership has no minimum gain with respect to
the property.19 5  Thus, no portion of the nonrecourse
liability is allocated to any partner to match his or her
share of minimum gain.
If, immediately after the contribution, the partnership
sold the property for no consideration other than
satisfaction of the $99 nonrecourse liability, the
partnership would recognize a $1 book loss and a $39 built-in
tax gain ($99 amount realized, less adjusted basis of $60).
This entire $39 tax gain would be allocated to the
contributing partner under § 704(c). Therefore, the
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contributing partner is allocated a $39 share of the $99
nonrecourse liability to match his share of the built-in
§ 704(c) gain. The $60 balance of the nonrecourse liability
is an "excess nonrecourse liability" that is allocated among
the partners according to their interests in partnership
profits. Thus, as a one percent partner, the contributing
partner's initial share of the nonrecourse liability is
$39.60.
Assuming that the partnership's only liability is the
$99 nonrecourse liability, the effect of the contribution on
the contributing partner is that he contributes property with
a basis of $60 and receives a net § 752(b) distribution of
$59.40,196 leaving him with no gain recognized as a result of
the contribution and a basis in his partnership interest of
sixty cents. But for the fact that the New Regulations
attract nonrecourse liabilities to cover the contributing
partner's built-in gain under § 704(c), this partner would
have recognized a gain of $38.01 on the contribution ($98.01
net § 752(b) distribution, less $60 basis of contributed
property).
The mechanical application of these rules can be quite
complex, because § 704(c) applies only to the excess of the book
value to the partnership over its tax basis and partnership
minimum gain is computed by reference to the book value (not the
basis) of contributed property. If the contributed property is
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depreciable, book depreciation deductions will exceed tax
depreciation deductions if the book value of the property exceeds
its tax basis. Over time, these book-tax depreciation differences
will decrease the difference between the book value and tax basis
of the contributed property, the amount of built-in gain subject
to § 704(c) will also decrease, and the amount of nonrecourse
liabilities allocated to cover the declining built-in gain will
also decrease. Moreover, any reductions in a partner's share of
nonrecourse liabilities that results from a decrease in his
built-in § 704(c) gain must be reallocated, first, to the partners
197to the extent of any increase in minimum gain for the year , and
198
then to the partners according to their interests in profits.
This calculation is further complicated by the fact that
partnership minimum gain is computed by reference to the excess of
nonrecourse liabilities over the book value of partnership
property.199
Example. A partner contributes property with a value of
$100 and a basis of zero to a partnership. The property is
encumbered by a nonrecourse liability of $90. The
partnership has no other liabilities and the partner makes no
other contribution to the partnership. The contributing
partner has a ninety percent interest in partnership profits;
however, the agreement validly allocates only fifty percent
of the partnership's nonrecourse deductions to the
contributing partner. During the partnership's first year,
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it has no income or loss other than a book depreciation
deduction of $20 with respect to the contributed property.
At the time of contribution, the entire $90 nonrecourse
liability is allocated to the contributing partner2 0 0 and the
beginning basis of his partnership interest is zero. At the
end of year one, the § 704(c) gain with respect to the
property is reduced from $100 to $80, because of the $20 year
one book depreciation deduction. Therefore, at the end of
year one only $80 of the $90 nonrecourse liability is
allocated to the contributing partner under New Regulation
§ 1.752-1T(e)(1)(ii). The remaining $10 of the nonrecourse
liability must be allocated under either New Regulation
§ 1.752-1T(e)(1)(i) or § 1.752-1T(e)(1)(iii).
During year one, partnership minimum gain increases from
zero to $10 (excess of $90 nonrecourse liability, over the
$80 book value of the property at the end of the year).
Thus, the $10 portion of the nonrecourse liability that is no
longer allocated to the contributing partner under New
Regulation § 1.752-1T(e)(1)(ii) must be reallocated to the
partners, under Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(e)(1)(i), in the manner
that they share the $10 increase in minimum gain. Since only
50 percent of the partnership's nonrecourse deductions are
allocated to the contributing partner, his share of the $10
increase in minimum gain is $5. Thus, the contributing
partner's share of the nonrecourse liability under New
Regulation § 1.752-lT(e)(1)(ii) has decreased by $10, while
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his share of the $10 portion of the liability that is
allocated under New Regulation § 1.752-1T(e)(1)(i) increases
by only $5. The $5 difference results in a net § 752(b)
distribution of $5 to the contributing partner, which is
taxable to him under § 731(a)(1) since his basis is zero.
[5] Tiered Partnerships
The Regulations provide that if one partnership (an
"upper-tier partnership") is a partner in another partnership (a
"subsidiary partnership"), the upper-tier partnership's share of
the subsidiary partnership's liabilities (other than any such
liability that is owed to the upper-tier partnership) shall be
treated as a liability of the upper-tier partnership for purposes
of determining the bases of the partners of the upper-tier
partnership. Unlike the Regulations governing the allocation of
recourse liabilities, 2 0 1 however, the Regulations governing the
allocation of nonrecourse liabilities contain no special rules for
determining the upper-tier partnership's share of the subsidiary
partnership's nonrecourse liabilities.
Under these circumstances, it appears that the procedure for
dealing with nonrecourse liabilities in tier partnership
situations is as follows: First, determine the extent to which
any partner of the subsidiary partnership bears the economic risk
of loss for the subsidiary's liabilities. In making this
determination, apply the the special tier partnership rules to
determine the upper-tier partnership's economic risk of loss for
such liabilities. 2 02 Second, as to any of the subsidiary
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partnership's liabilities for which no partner (including the
upper-tier partnership) bears the economic risk of loss (and which
are, therefore, nonrecourse liabilities of the subsidiary
partnership), apply the normal rules for allocating nonrecourse
liabilities as if the upper-tier partnership were not itself a
partnership. The upper-tier partnership's share of the
sibsidiary's nonrecourse liabilities, as so determined, are
treated as nonrecourse liabilities of the upper-tier partnreship
for purposes of applying § 752 to its partners. To determine the
interest of of the partners of the upper-tier partnership in the
subsiduary partnership's minimum gain, reference should be made to
the special tier partnership rules contained in the § 704(b)
Regulaitons. 203
1 8.05 Related Persons
Under the New Regulations, a partner shares recourse
partnership liabilities to the extent the partner, or a related
person to the partner, bears the "economic risk of loss" for such
liabilities. 204 In addition, the S 752 definitions of economic
risk of loss (with all its references to related persons) and
nonrecourse liability are imported to the § 704(b) Regulations.
2 0 5
Thus, the concept of "related persons" has a significant impact on
the application of both § 752 and § 704(b).
For these purposes, a person is related to a partner "if and
only if such person and the partner bear a relationship to each
other that is specified in section 267(b) (without modification by
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section 267(e)(1)) or section 707(b)(l) ....... 206 The potential
breadth of this definition is considerably narrowed, however, by
New Regulation § 1.752-1T(h)(2), which provides that --
sections 267(b) and 707(b)(1) shall be applied by --
(i) Substituting "80 percent or more" for "more than 50
percent" each place it appears in such sections;
(ii) Excluding brothers and sisters from the members of
a person's family; and
(iii) Disregarding section 267(f)(1)(A).
The New Regulations provide generally that if a person is
related to more than one partner, he will be treated as related to
the partner to whom he has the "greatest percentage of related
.207
ownership." In those cases in which a person has an equal
percentage of related ownership to more than one partner, such
person's payment obligation, contribution obligation or interest
in a partner nonrecourse liability, as the case may be, shall be
allocated equally to all such equally related partners, unless the
facts and circumstances indicate that such benefit or burden
should be allocated among the equally related partners in a
different manner.
The percentage of related ownership is the greater of the
percentage ownership of the related person by the partner, or the
208
percentage ownership of the partner by the related person. All
natural persons who are related by virtue of being members of the
same family are treated as having a percentage relationship of
zero. This does not mean that they are not related persons;
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rather it means that they are equally related (a partner is
equally related to his parents, spouse and children for this
purpose).
The New Regulations provide that members of the same
partnership will generally not be treated as related persons to
each other for purposes of applying S 752 to the liabilities of
that partnership. 209
-96-
Temp. Reg. § 1.752-4T(a).
2 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-4T(b). This Regulation also contains an
exeption for binding written contracts in effect prior to
March 1, 1984 and at all times thereafter.
Temp. Reg. § 1.752-4T(b) does not appear to support this
interpretation, but is likely to be clarified by the
Treasury, hopefully soon.
Temp. Reg. § 1.752-4T(c). For calendar year partnerships,
this means that the election had to be made on their returns
for calendar year 1988; those partnerships that filed their
1988 returns without making the election have permanently
missed the opportunity to have all of their liability sharing
issues resolved under the New Regulations and, for ill or
good, must continue to live under a combination of the old
and new liability sharing regimes as long as they have
pre-January 30, 1989 liabilities.
5 Cf. Marcus W. Melvin, 88 TC 63, 75-76 (1987) (reliance on
legislative history of § 79 of the Tax Reform Act of 1984 in
applying Old Regulations).
6 Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956). The proposed regulation published
for public comment prior to the adoption of this final
regulation contained no sharing rules. See Prop. Reg.
§ 1.752-1 (1955).
Cf. Rev. Proc. 89-12, § 1.02, 1989-7 I.R.B. 22 (application
of classification ruling requirements to entities not formed
under the Uniform Partnership Act or a version of the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act).
See Uniform Limited Partnership Act S 2; Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act § 201 (1976 and 1985); R. Whitmire,
W. Nelson, W. McKee & M. Kuller, Federal Taxation of
Partnerships and Partners: Structuring and Drafting
Agreements 4.0611] (1989). Cf. John A. Laney, 39 TCM 654
(1979) (issue 1) (two-month hiatus between formation and
filing of certificate does not create a general partnership
under Texas law; late filing is "substantial compliance"),
aff'd on this issue, 674 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1982).
See Uniform Limited Partnership Act S 7; Revised Uniform
Limitd Partnership Act § 303 (1976 and 1985); R. Whitmire, W.
Nelson, W. McKee & M. Kuller, Federal Taxation of
Partnerships and Partners: Structuring and Drafting
Agreements 8.01 (1989). Cf. Financial Dynamics, Ltd. v.
United States, 80-2 USTC 9585 (M.D. Fla. 1980); Ina L.
Block, 41 TCM 546, 551 (1980) (taxpayer limited partner
failed to prove that his activity would have subjected him to
liability as general partner under applicable state law;
"intriguing issue" of whether general partner liability under
state law results in general partner status under Old
Regulation § 1.752-1(e) not reached).
10 See Rev. Rul. 69-223, 1969-1 CB 184, 185 (entire amount of
recourse liability increases general partner's basis:
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general partner's interest in profits and losses only 10
percent).
See 1 6.01.
12 Although theoretically sound, the reliance on loss-sharing
ratios to apportion recourse liabilities may be criticized
because it ignores the vast majority of cases in which the
partnership does not fail, and the liability is satisfied out
of partnership profits. Furthermore, most loans, whether
recourse or nonrecourse, are based primarily on the value of
the property used to secure the loan, and in the event of
default, the lender typically looks first to the property
rather than any persons who may be personally liable.
Nevertheless, allocating recourse liabilities in accordance
with ultimate loss-sharing ratios is consistent with the
manner in which partnership losses are allocated under
§ 704(b). The New Regulations, like the Old Regulations,
look to risk of loss to allocate recourse liabilities.
In Cecil R. Richardson, 76 TC 512, 529-530 (1981), aff'd
on other issues, 693 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1982), the Tax Court
dealt with the basis consequences of an agreement among
general partners as to which of them would be responsible for
certain partnership liabilities. In Richardson, a number of
new partners were admitted to an existing partnership. In
connection with their admission, the old partners agreed to
be solely responsible for certain partnership debts. For
purposes of computing the § 752(b) deemed distribution and
the concomitant § 731 gain to the old partners upon admission
of the new partners, the court allocated the specified
liabilities entirely to the old partners.
Although difficult to rationalize in terms of the
sharing rules of S 1.752-1(e) of the Old Regulations, the
result reached in Richardson appears sensible in the context
of the business arrangement and the risk sharing between the
old and new partners. Further, the same result would be
reached if the old partners were treated as individually
assuming the specified partnership liabilities, thereby
entitling them to § 752(a) basis increases by reason of the
constructive cash contributions associated with their
assumption of the liabilities. Unfortunately, the Richardson
opinion does not refer to either § 752(a) or the Old
Regulations, and it is unclear whether the court (a) viewed
the transaction as if the old partners had individually
assumed the liabilities, or (b) intended to sanction an
allocation of partnership liabilities among partners based on
their business agreement rather than the S 1.752-1(e)
Regulations. See James V. Proesel, 77 TC 992 (1981)
(recourse liability allocated according to loss-sharing
ratios; guarantee of, and actual payment by, certain partners
does not preclude inclusion by all partners of pro rata share
of recourse liability).
..J See Richard C. Brown, 40 TCM 725, 730 (1980) (quoting this
text with approval), aff'd unpublished opinion (9th Cir.
1982).
14 See Raphan v. United States, 759 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir. 1985),
(cert. denied) ("nonrecourse" partnership loan personally
guaranteed by general partner classified as recourse loan for
purposes of Old Regulation § 1.752-1(e), notwithstanding
guarantor's rights as creditor of partnership if called upon
to honor guarantee), rev'g on this issue 83-2 USTC 1 9613
(Cl. Ct. 1983); Marcus W. Melvin, 88 TC 63 (1987); Sidney J.
Gefen, 87 TC 1471 (1986); Edwin D. Abramson, 86 TC 360 (1986)
(limited partner who guarantees part of otherwise nonrecourse
partnership debt may increase basis by amount guaranteed);
George F. Smith, Jr., 84 TC 889 (1985) (assumption
agreement), aff'd unpublished opinion (D.C. Cir. 1986); Rev.
Rul. 83-151, 1983-2 CB 105 ("nonrecourse" loan guaranteed by
general partner; limited partner may not include in basis).
Prior to being reversed by the Federal Circuit, the Claims
Court's decision in Raphan inspired the enactment of § 79 of
the Tax Reform Act of 1984, authorizing the promulgation of
New Regulations to overrule the Claims Court's decision in
Raphan.
15 46 TC 147 (1966).
16 Inexplicably, the Commissioner did not attack the partnership
as an association, notwithstanding the presence of a "dummy"
general partner. See Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(2); 3.06.
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if See also John A. Laney, 39 TCM 654 (1979), aff'd, 674 F.2d
342 (5th Cir. 1982); Richard C. Brown, 40 TCM 725 (1980),
aff'd unpublished opinion (9th Cir. 1982).
18 The New Regulations are generally consistent with the holding
of Kingbay. Thus, Temp. Reg. S 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(D)(2)
provides generally that, for purposes of determining whether
a partner bears the economic risk of loss with respect to a
partnership liability, it is assumed that all persons
discharge their legal obligations, whether or not they would
in fact have the net worth to do so if the partnership's
assets were worthless; however, Temp. Reg.
§ 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(D)(Q) provides an "anti-gaming" rule
under which this performance assumption does not apply if the
facts and circumstances indicate a plan to avoid the
obligation. See infra 8.03[5][e].
19 This distinction was rejected in John A. Laney, 39 TCM 654,
662 (1979) (issue 1), aff'd, 674 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1982).
Cf. Richard C. Brown, 40 TCM 725 (1980), aff'd unpublished
opinion (9th Cir. 1982). Under the New Regulations, a
liability is a recourse liability to the extent any partner
bears the economic risk of loss with respect to such
liability, even if such risk is borne in a non-partner
capacity. See Temp. Reg. §§ 1.752-1T(d)(2), 1.752-1T(d)(3);
infra 1 8.03[2].
20 Reg. S 1.752-1(e) (emphasis added).
-6-
See, e.g., Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 US 609, 613
(1938): "A given result at the end of a straight path is not
made a different result because reached by following a
devious path." However, if the conduit purchase is made
through a nonpartner nominee corporation (see 1 3.10) and no
partner is personally liable for debts encumbering the
property, the Service has ruled that the debts are
nonrecourse for purposes of § 752. Rev. Rul. 75-31, 1975-1
CB 10.
22 Dillingham v. United States, 1981-2 USTC 9601 (WD Okla,
1981) (oil and gas drilling partnership). But cf. Raphan v.
United States, 759 F.2d 879 (Fed. Civ. 1985) (cert. denied),
(nonrecourse loan to partnership guaranteed by general
partner; held, liability is recourse for § 752 purposes)
rev'g on this issue 83-2 USTC 11 9613 Cl. Ct. 1983).
23 See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(i)(B).
24 Cf. Carriage Square, Inc., 69 TC 119, 141 (1977) (dissenting
opinion) (sole shareholder of corporate general partner
guarantees partnership borrowings; for purposes of
§ 704(e)(1), borrowed funds should be considered part of
general partner's capital investment in partnership).
25 One possible technique to avoid this argument is to structure
the shareholder's guaranty to exclude shares of the general
partner from the assets to which the creditor may look for
satisfaction of the guaranty. If the lender is willing to
negotiate on this basis, such an exclusion is clearly
-7-
advisable as a matter of careful tax planning. If a
partnership debt is guaranteed by an unrelated third party,
which is paid a fee by the partnership for performing this
service, the guaranty should not disturb the nonrecourse
character of the debt: No "partner" is personally liable,
nor are the assets of any partner at risk as a result of such
a guaranty. See Rev. Rul. 75-31, 1975-1 CB 10.
26 See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(A)(1)(i). Related
persons are defined by Temp. Reg. § 1.752-lT(h) to include
generally spouses, lineal ancestors and descendants, and
eighty percent controlled entities; see infra If 8.05.
27 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-4T(b).
28 Id.
29 See Arthur E. Long, 77 TC 1045, 1074-1075 (1981) (dicta).
30 See Ina L. Block, 41 TCM 546 (1980). The guarantor-limited
partner apparently is not entitled to increase his basis as a
consequence of the guaranty. Cf. Rev. Rul. 69-223, 1969-1 CB
184.
31 77 TC 1045, 1074-1075 (1981).
32 Rev. Rul. 84-118, 1984-2 CB 120.
33 84 TC 889, 903-904 (1985), aff'd unpublished opinion (DC Cir.
1986).
Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(j)(2).
35 83-2 USTC 9613 (Cl. Ct. 1983), rev'd on this issue, 759
F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
36 H.R. Rep. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1235 (1984).
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i' The reversal of the Claims Court decision in Raphan occurred
after the 1984 Act was enacted.
38 H.R. Rep. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 869 (1984).
39 Id.
40 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(2). Although this part of the New
Regulation does not expressly refer to related persons, it
refers to Temp. Reg. S 1.752-1T(d)(3), which includes a
panoply of related person rules.
41 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(1). Again, although this portion of
the New Regulation does not expressly refer to related
persons, it includes a reference to Temp. Reg. § 1.752-
iT(d)(3).
42 Temp. Reg. §§ 1.752-1T(d)(3)(i)(B), 1.752-
iT(d)(3)(ii)(A)(2Z)(i).
43 See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-lT(d)(3). The term "economic risk of
loss" is taken from the legislative history to S 79 of the
Tax Reform Act of 1984, which is the statutory predicate for
the New Regulations. H.R. Rep. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
869 (1984).
Temp. Reg. S 1.752-1T(a)(1)(ii).
45 Temp. Reg. 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(D); cf. Reg.
§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(h) (broadly defining the term
"partnership agreement" for purposes of the allocation rules
of S 704(b)). Under the Old Regulations it was not clear
whether indemnities and the like would be taken into account
-9-
in determining a limited partner's obligation to make an ad-
ditional contribution. See supra I 8.02[21[c].
46 Temp. Reg. SS 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(A)(1)(ii),
1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(B)(3), 1.752-lT(d)(3)(ii)(C).
47 Related person is defined in Reg. § 1.752-IT(h). See infra
1 8.05.
48 See Temp. Reg. §§ 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(D)(.Z), 1.752-
IT(d)(3)(ii)(D)(3).
See Temp. Reg. §§ 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(A)(I), 1.752-
iT(d)(3)(ii)(B)(!) (both of which require a determination of
economic risk of loss in the context of a "constructive
liquidation," within the meaning of Temp. Reg. S 1.752-
iT(d)(3)(iii)).
50 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(a)(l)(iv).
Temp. Reg. § 1.752-IT(d)(3)(iii)(A)(1).
52 See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(A)(2)(ii). Such assets,
to the extent of their fair market value, are treated as
disposed of in complete or partial satisfaction of the li-
abilities they secure. See infra v 8.03[5][c].
Since the purpose of the entire exercise is to determine the
amounts that the partners (and related persons) would be
obligated to pay or contribute with respect to partnership
liabilities, these obligations are given full effect in the
analysis, and the New Regulations explicitly assume that in
most instances each partner and related person will fully
-10-
perform these obligations. See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-
1T(d)(3)(ii)(D)(2); infra 8.03[5][e].
54 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(iii)(A)(2).
55 See Temp. Reg. S 1.752-1T(d)(3)(i); infra I 8.03[7][c].
56 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(iii)(A)(3).
57 See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(A)(Z)(ii); infra
I 8.03[5][c].
58 See Temp. Reg. S 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(B)(A)(ii).
59 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(iii)(A)(4).).
Id.
61 See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-lT(d)(3)(ii)(A)(2)(ii).
62 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(i)(A).
63 Temp. Reg. S 1.752-1T(d)(3)(i)(A)(2); see supra I 8.03[3] for
a discussion of the constructive liquidation concept.
64 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(B)(Z)(i). Consistent with
the S 704 capital account maintenance rules (see Reg.
§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(d)(2), a promissory note made by a
partner and contributed to a partnership is treated as a
contribution, rather than a contribution obligation, if the
note is readily tradeable on an established securities market
at the time of its contribution. A promissory note that is
made by a related person and contributed after December 29,
1988, is treated for § 752 purposes as made by the partner.
Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(B)(Z) (penultimate sentence).
65 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(B)(Z)(ii).
66 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(B)(2)(iii).
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67 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-lT(d)(3)(ii)(B)(3).
68 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(B)(1).
69 Similarly, each partner has a $25 share of the $50 liability.
70 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-lT(d)(3)(ii)(B)(A)(i)(A). Temp.
Reg. S 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(B)(4)(ii) defines the portion of a
partnership liabilities for which a creditor's right to
repayment is limited to one or more assets of the partnership
by excluding the portion of such liability that is not so
limited. Thus, a creditor's right to repayment of a
liability is limited to the extent that the total outstanding
balance of such liability "exceeds the aggregate amount that
the partners would be obligated to contribute to the
partnership to discharge that liability if ... the
partnership constructively liquidated." Id.
In determining the amounts the partners would have to
contribute to satisfy a liability in a constructive
liquidation, two modifications to the normal assumptions
relating to constructive liquidations are made. First, in
applying the constructive liquidation rules, it is assumed,
contrary to Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(iii)(A), that any
assets that have been contributed for the limited purpose of
securing partnership liabilities (see Temp. Reg. § 1.752-
IT(d)(3)(ii)(A)(2)(ii)) become worthless. The reason for
this modification is mechanical: Temp. Reg.
S 1.752-lT(d)(3)(ii)(B)(4)(i)(B) provides directly that a
partnership does not have an indebtedness with respect to a
-12-
liability that is secured by assets described in Temp.
Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(A)(2)(ii). Therefore, to avoid a
double exclusion it is necessary not to treat such li-
abilities as liabilities to which the creditor's right to
repayment is limited to one or more partnership assets under
Temp. Reg. §§ 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(B)(j)(i)(A) and
1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(B)(4)(ii).
Second, in determining whether a liability is one as to
which the creditor's right is limited to partnership assets,
Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(B)(4)(ii)(B) assumes,
contrary to the general rule in Temp. Reg.
§ 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(D)(2), that in the constructive liquida-
tion the partners do not satisfy their payment obligations
(as opposed to contribution obligations) under Temp. Reg.
§ 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(A)(2).
71 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(B)(4J(i)(B).
72 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(i)(A). In addition, a partner
has the economic risk of loss if he is the holder of an
otherwise nonrecourse partnership liability. Temp.
Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(i)(B).
Temp. Reg. §§ 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(A)(1); 1.752-
iT(d)(3)(ii)(A)(2).
74 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(A)(.a)(i) (penultimate
sentence).
Temp. Reg. § 1.752-lT(d)(3)(ii)(A)(.2)(ii).
76 Id; cf. Rev. Rul. 55-39, 1955-1 CB 403 (1939 Code).
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See infra 8.03[5][c].
78 See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-lT(k) Example (12)(ii). Temp. Reg.
5 1.752-lT(d)(3)(ii)(A)(2)(ii) also contains a tracing rule
under which the solely for security rule applies if the
partnership uses the proceeds of contributed property to
acquire other property that, in turn, is used solely to
secure a partnership liability.
Temp. Reg. §S 1.752-lT(d)(3)(ii)(A)(1)(ii),
1.752-lT(d)(3)(ii)(B)(3).
80 Temp. Reg. §§ 1.752-lT(d)(3)(ii)(A)(2)(i)(B),
1.752-lT(d)(3)(ii)(B)(2)(iii).
81 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(C). A right to be reimbursed
by a person other than a partner, related person to a
partner, or the partnership is not treated as a right to
reimbursement. However, the preamble to the New Regulations,
indicates that the Service is still considering whether to
extend the concept of reimbursement to include rights to be
reimbursed by unrelated third parties.
82 Temp. Reg. S 1.752-lT(d)(3)(ii)(D)(1)(i).
83 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(D)(i)(lii).
84 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(D)(.)(ii). Example (16 of
New Regulation § 1.752-lT(k) illustrates the facts and
circumstances test. It involves a liability of a general
partnership that is secured by a mortgage on a building. The
liability is generally nonrecourse, but the partnership is
liable to the creditor "to the extent of any decrease in the
-14-
value of the . . . building resulting from the partnership's
failure to properly maintain the property." If the building
were to diminish in value because of the partnership's
failure to maintain it, the general partners would be liable
to make contributions to satisfy the partnership's obligation
if the partnership's assets were inadequate. Therefore, the
question addressed by the example is whether the legally
enforceable obligation to indemnify the creditor for
decreases in value attributable to lack of maintenance
constitutes an obligation to make a contribution to the
partnership in the event of constructive liquidation. In the
example, no facts establish "with reasonable certainty the
existence of any liability on the part of the partnership
(and its partners) for damages resulting from the
partnership's failure to properly maintain the
building... " Accordingly, the example concludes that the
indemnification obligation does not establish a contribution
obligation on the part of any partner and, hence, that no
partner has any economic risk of loss with respect to the
liability. Thus, the liability is not a recourse liability.
Of course, the result would be different if the facts clearly
indicated that the value of the building had diminished as a
result of inadequate maintenance. The facts and
circumstances test of Temp. Reg. § 1.752-
1T(d)(3)(ii)(D)(1)(ii) should be read in conjunction with
Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(iv) under which "arrangements
-15-
tantamount to a guarantee" are treated as actual guarantees.
See infra 8.03[5][b).
85 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(D)(2). See generally infra
I 8.03[5][e].
86 See Temp. Reg. S 1.752-1T(k) Example (10).
87 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(D)(2). See infra
I 8.03151[e].
88 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(D)(2) (last sentence).
89 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(iv).
90 In applying these rules, it is significant that, under the
New Regulations, a single liability may be treated as a
recourse liability in part and a nonrecourse liability in
part. Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(j)(2). Thus, if a partner
guarantees that collateral for an otherwise nonrecourse
liability will have a minimum value that is less than the
full amount of the liability, the portion of the liability
equal to the guaranteed value may be treated as a recourse
liability and the remainder as a nonrecourse liability.
Moreover, an undertaking that eliminates the creditor's risk
for a period of time that is less than the entire term of the
liability should be treated as tantamount to a guarantee
during the time that the undertaking is effective. The
relevant question is whether, at the particular time the
liability is being tested, the undertaking would eliminate
the creditor's risk under the facts of a constructive
liquidation occurring at that time.
-16-
91 Temp. Reg. S 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(F)(1).
92 "Property" for this purpose does not include a promissory
note if the maker of the note is the person who is obligated
to make the contribution or payment, unless the note is
readily tradable on an established securities market.
Moreover, a partner's interest in the partnership is deemed
to have a value of zero for this purpose. Therefore, a
partner (or related person) does not have a contribution or
payment obligation to the extent his obligation to make a
payment with respect to a partnership liability or a
contribution to the partnership is secured only by a pledge
of his interest in the partnership.
93 Temp. Reg. S l.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(F)()(i).
Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(F)(1)(ii).
95 The anti-abuse rule in the New Regulations is limited to
liabilities that are nonrecourse as to principal, even though
the perceived abuse could also apply to liabilities that are
recourse as to principal. This result was clearly intended.
See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(v)(A) (last sentence).
96 Temp. Req. § l.752-T(d)(3)(v)(A).
See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(v)(B).
98 Temp. Reg. S 1.752-lT(k).
9 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(v)(A).
See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-lT(k) Example (2.
101 Temp. Reg. S 1.752-1T(d)(3)(v)(A).
102 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(D)(2).
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103 id.
104 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(D)(3).
105 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(k) Example (11).
106 Example (10) of New Regulation S 1.752-1T(k) involves
precisely these facts. In Example (10), the limited
partner's indemnification agreement does not give rise to a
net payment obligation of the limited partner because, under
the general operating rules of the New Regulations, it is
assumed that the general partner will perform its
contribution obligation and, therefore, the indemnification
obligation of the limited partner will never be required to
be performed.
107 Cf. Reg. § 1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(c) (penultimate sentence)
(deficit capital account restoration obligation may be
ignored for purposes of applying the economic effect test if
"the facts and circumstances otherwise indicate a plan to
avoid or circumvent such obligation"). In view of the stated
objective of the New Regulations to "coordinate" with the
S 704(b) Regulations (see Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(a)(1)(iv)),
this provision of the 5 704(b) Regulations and the comparable
anti-abuse rule in the New Regulations should be applied
consistently to avoid whipsawing partners by allocating
losses and liabilities in difference ways. Unfortunately,
because the rules are worded somewhat differently, it remains
to be seen whether the courts will adopt this approach.
108 See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(E)(1).
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109 See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-IT(d)(3)(ii)(E)(I)(i).
110 See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(iii)(A)().
Temp. Reg. 5 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(E)(1)(ii); cf. Reg.
§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(c).
112 Temp. Reg. S 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(E)(Q)(i). Temp. Reg.
§ l.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(E)()(ii) attempts to prevent
unreasonable delays in liquidation from being an effective
means to avoid the general timing rules of Temp. Reg.
§ 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(E). However, the effectiveness of this
provision is constricted by the statute of limitations, since
it will not be known that an unacceptable delay has occurred
in liquidating a partner's interest until the liquidation
actually occurs.
113 See 12.02.
114 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(E)(3)(iii).
115 Because such an obligation fails the requirement of Temp.
Reg. § l.752-lT(d)(3)(ii)(E)(I)(ii), it apparently is taken
into account only to the extent of its discounted value under
Reg. § l.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(E)(2). Under this Regulation,
however, the discount factor seems to be zero, since it
requires that discounted value be determined by reference to
the "value that such obligation would have if the partnership
constructively liquidated at the time of such determination."
id.
116 See Temp. Reg. 5 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(E)(4).
117 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(E)(5).
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118 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(E)(Z)(i).
119 See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(E)(2.)(ii)(A).
120 See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(E)(2)(ii)().
121 See Temp. Reg. S 1.752-1T(k) Example (13)(ii).
122 This example is based on Temp. Reg. 5 1.752-lT(k) Examvle
123 See Temp. Reg. S 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(D)(2).
124 This example is based on Temp. Reg. S 1.752-1T(k) Example
(41.
125 See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(A)(2).
See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(C).
127 The analysis, but not the result, of this example would
change if, under terms of B's guarantee, the creditor were
required to exhaust his remedies against the partnership
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129 See Temp Reg. S 1.752-lT(d)(3)(ii)(B)(1).
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137 See Temp. Reg. S 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(A)(2)(i)(B).
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-21-
139 This example is based on Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(k) Example
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140 See Temp. Reg. S 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(A)(2)(ii).
141 See Temp. Reg. 5 1.752-1T(d)(3)(iii)(A)(!).
142 See Temp. Reg. S 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(B)(1).
143 See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(B)(I)()(k).
144 This example is based on Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(k) Example
13)
145 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-lT(d)(3)(iii)(B).
146 See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(iii)(A)().
147 See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(B)(A)(ii).
148 See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-lT(d)(3)(ii)(E).
149 See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(B)(j).
150 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(i)(B). Such liabilities are
referred to in the § 704(b) Regulations as "partner
nonrecourse debt." Temp. Reg. 5 1.704-1T(b)(iv)(k)(4).
Example (18) of Temp. Reg. S 1.752-lT(k) provides an example
of the determination of the economic risk of loss with
respect to a nonrecourse debt that is held by a person
related to one partner and guaranteed, in part, by another
partner.
151 See generally 7.02[2].
152 See infra 8.05.
153 See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(vii); see 10.11[1].
154 Literally, the de minimis rule is limited to amounts borrowed
"with respect to the activity of holding real property"
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(§ 465(b)(6)(B)(i)), since this is the only type of loan that
can constitute "qualified nonrecourse financing" within the
meaning of § 465(b)(6). It is not clear whether this limita-
tion was intended by the drafters of the New Regulations.
155 See 1 3.03[3] [1st Edition].
156 See §§ 465(b)(6)(D), 46(c)(8)(D)(iv). The lender must be
"actively and regularly engaged in the business of lending
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158 A "related person" within the meaning of S 46(c)(8)(D)(v)
cannot be a qualified lender for purposes of § 465(b)(6)
unless the loan is "commercially reasonable and on
substantially the same terms as loans involving unrelated
persons." § 465(b)(6)(D)(ii). The relevant "related person"
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§§ 267(b) and 707(b)(1), modified to reduce "50%" to "10%."
Since the lender (or a related person) will not have more
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§ 707(b)(1). The possible application of § 267(b) is less
certain because of § 267(e), which provides that for certain
purposes a person who owns (directly or indirectly) any
capital or profits interest in a partnership is a related
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for the first mortgage liability.
In Example 2, if the wrapping indebtedness (the second
mortgage owed to the selling partner) were a recourse obliga-
tion, the wrapped indebtedness would be ignored and the
entire wrapping indebtedness would be treated as single
recourse partnership liability.
161 Temp. Reg. S 1.752-1T(j)(1). This rule does not apply to
liabilities of the subsidiary partnership that are owed to
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guaranteed this liability does not prevent the upper-tier
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Example (4).
165 See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(vi)(B).
166 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(j)(5).
167 Temp. Reg. S 1.752-1T(d)(i)(last sentence).
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174 See Temp. Reg. § 1.704-1T(b)(4)(iv)(f).
175 Temp. Reg. § 1.752-1T(e)(3)(i).
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l(b)(2) (iv)(r).
195 Temp. Reg.§ 1.704-lT(b)(4)(iv)().
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